India
Source: www.pib.gov.in

Competition Commission of India (CCI) hosts BRICS Heads of Competition Authorities 2026 meeting

Heads of BRICS Competition Authorities adopt Joint Statement on ‘Strengthening Cooperation to Promote Fair Competition, including in Renewable Energy Markets’

BRICS Competition Authorities Heads reaffirm commitment for cooperation, dialogue, and knowledge-sharing to promote effective competition enforcement and address challenges in increasingly interconnected markets

Under India's BRICS Chairship 2026, the Meeting of Heads of BRICS Competition Authorities was organised by the Competition Commission of India (CCI), on 8^th August, 2026 in Udaipur, Rajasthan.
The meeting brought together the Heads and senior representatives of competition authorities from BRICS member countries to strengthen cooperation in promoting fair competition and addressing emerging challenges in competition law and policy.

In her inaugural address, Smt. Ravneet Kaur, Chairperson, CCI underscored the shared responsibility of BRICS competition authorities to preserve and promote competitive markets that foster efficiency, consumer welfare, innovation, and opportunities for businesses to compete on merit.
Highlighting the increasingly cross-border nature of digital markets and emerging technologies, the Chairperson, CCI observed that sustained cooperation and knowledge-sharing among BRICS competition authorities would be essential for developing informed, effective, and future-ready approaches to competition enforcement.

Referring to the global transition towards renewable energy and sustainability, she noted that continued collaboration among BRICS competition authorities would contribute to fostering fair and competitive renewable energy markets while advancing the shared objectives of sustainable growth and energy security. She also emphasised that, amidst evolving market dynamics and emerging enforcement challenges, competition law interventions must remain principled, evidence-based, and firmly anchored in the core objectives of competition law.

During the Meeting, the Heads of BRICS Competition Authorities exchanged views on recent developments in competition law and policy in their respective jurisdictions, including significant enforcement initiatives, institutional developments, and emerging challenges in their domestic markets.

As part of India's BRICS Chairship, the CCI steered a collaborative BRICS study titled "Emerging Competition Landscape in the Renewable Energy Sector in BRICS", to develop a better understanding of the evolving competition dynamics in renewable energy markets across BRICS jurisdictions and identifying areas for future cooperation. The key findings of the Study were presented during the Meeting.

During the meeting, a Joint Statement of Heads of BRICS Competition Authorities titled "Strengthening Cooperation to Promote Fair Competition, including in Renewable Energy Markets", was adopted. The Joint Statement reflects the shared commitment of BRICS competition authorities to promote competitive, innovative, resilient and sustainable renewable energy markets and to enhance knowledge sharing among BRICS Competition Authorities in addressing emerging competition issues associated with the global energy transition.

The Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), Brazil, briefed the participants on its preparations for the Xth BRICS International Competition Conference, scheduled to be held in Brazil in 2027.

The Meeting concluded with closing remarks by the Heads of BRICS Competition Authorities, who reaffirmed their commitment for continued cooperation, dialogue, and knowledge-sharing to promote effective competition enforcement and address emerging challenges in increasingly interconnected markets.

Russia
Source: bricscompetition.org

Review №26 of Chinese Antitrust News from the Experts of the BRICS Competition Centre

- European Commission Says Temu May Have Obstructed Investigation
- 12 Shanghai Ride-Hailing Services Fined $3.7 Million
- Electronic Licensing Introduced to Combat 'Ghost' Restaurants
- M&A Review Delegation System Expanded

European Commission Says Temu May Have Obstructed Investigation

The European Commission has issued a Statement of Grounds to PDD Holdings, the owner of online marketplace Temu, and its subsidiary WhaleCo, expressing preliminary concerns that the companies may have obstructed an inspection carried out under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR).

The Commission conducted an unannounced inspection of PDD and WhaleCo's premises in December 2025. It now alleges that Temu failed to provide requested information about its business operations, IT tools and systems, as well as specific reports and records. If confirmed, such conduct would constitute a breach of the company's procedural obligations under Article 14 of the FSR.

The Statement of Grounds sets out the Commission's preliminary findings and is a procedural step before any formal decision. The obstruction investigation is being conducted separately from, and in parallel with, the Commission's ongoing substantive investigation into whether Temu received foreign subsidies that distort competition in the EU internal market.

"Not providing the information prevented the Commission from reviewing sources of information that could be relevant for its investigation," the Commission said.

Temu rejected the Commission's allegations, stating that it fully cooperated with the inspection and complied with all information requests. The company also denied violating the FSR.

Temu has around 130 million users across the EU's 27 member states, representing nearly one-third of the bloc's population, making it one of Europe's largest e-commerce platforms.

Sources: EC, WeChat

12 Shanghai Ride-Hailing Services Fined $3.7 Million

As part of a broader regulatory campaign targeting ride-hailing platforms, an inter-agency task force conducted regulatory interviews with 12 companies and imposed a first round of fines totaling more than $3.7 million.

The violations involved operating without the required licenses, or using unlicensed drivers or vehicles. Most of the violations were attributed to industry leader Didi.

Source: WeChat

Electronic Licensing Introduced to Combat 'Ghost' Restaurants

China's State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) is introducing electronic business licenses for merchants and restaurants operating on online platforms as part of its campaign against violations in the food delivery sector.

The new policy is intended to modernize regulatory oversight through automated verification while creating a collaborative governance framework involving regulators, digital platforms, delivery providers, and consumers. Electronic licensing is expected to reduce verification time and improve enforcement efficiency.

The initiative follows SAMR's April 17 decision to fine seven major food delivery platforms for failing to prevent so-called "ghost restaurants"—vendors operating without the required food service licenses. The $570 million penalty was the largest ever imposed on digital platforms since China's Food Safety Law was revised in 2015.

Source: SAMR

M&A Review Delegation System Expanded

China expanded its delegated merger review system on August 1, 2026, implementing a decision adopted in March after a three-year pilot program.

In addition to the market regulators in Guangdong, Shaanxi, Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing, authorities in Sichuan, Liaoning, and Zhejiang have now been authorized to review certain simplified merger filings. The expansion is expected to reduce the workload of the central regulator while improving the speed and efficiency of merger reviews.

Since the pilot program began, delegated authorities have processed notifications efficiently, with an average of 16.28 days to accept filings and 17.52 days to complete reviews.
Source: SAMR

Egypt
Source: sis.gov.eg

Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade Mohamed Farid Saleh left for India on Thursday, August 6, 2026, to participate in the 16th BRICS Trade Ministers Meeting, held in Jaipur on August 6-7 under India’s 2026 BRICS chairmanship.

Egypt aims to maximize benefits from its BRICS membership, boost economic, trade, and investment cooperation with member states, and open new markets for Egyptian exports to integrate local firms into global value chains.

The meeting will address developing the multilateral trading system, trade facilitation, digital trade, supply chains, supporting SMEs, and promoting sustainable development.

On the sidelines, Saleh will hold bilateral talks with trade ministers and senior officials from member states to enhance economic ties, increase trade volume, and remove export barriers.

Meetings include officials from India, Brazil, China, Russia, Indonesia, South Africa, and the UAE to strengthen economic partnerships with emerging markets.

Ministry data shows trade between Egypt and BRICS reached $53.5 billion in 2025, up from $45 billion in 2024, while Egyptian exports to the bloc rose to $13.8 billion from $9.5 billion.

Egypt's participation aligns with efforts to boost multilateral cooperation, increase exports, attract investments, and enhance economic competitiveness.

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

Monopolies in international affairs rarely collapse overnight. They tend to erode quietly, losing their grip as alternative choices emerge and parallel pathways take shape.

For generations, the plumbing of global finance was routed through a single, heavily guarded intersection in the West. If a sovereign nation wanted to build a road, modernize a power grid or stabilize a national currency, it had to navigate a rigid labyrinth of conditionalities and approvals managed by institutions headquartered in Washington and Geneva.

But now, that map is being redrawn. The change is not happening through loud diplomatic confrontations, but through the quiet architecture of institutional choice.

Zimbabwe's recent admission to the BRICS New Development Bank, announced by the country's Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube in Harare, is a striking example of this global realignment.

After years of struggling with a complex economic landscape constrained by Western sanctions, limited liquidity, and restricted access to traditional international lending markets, Zimbabwe has unlocked a vital alternative channel for development finance by joining the Shanghai-based multilateral institution.

Focused squarely on infrastructure, industrialization, and long-term economic resilience, the NDB offers Harare an opportunity to pursue its development priorities through a broader range of financing options.

This milestone is more than a routine bureaucratic measure. It is a practical blueprint for how emerging markets facing economic duress can bypass traditional bottlenecks and secure sustainable growth outside Western-dominated corridors.

The significance of this shift becomes clearer against the backdrop of starkly divergent global economic policies. In the United States and Europe, policymakers increasingly treat global commerce as an instrument of national security, erecting protectionist tariffs, subsidizing domestic manufacturing through heavy state intervention, and weaponizing financial networks to isolate perceived adversaries. The underlying philosophy in these traditional centers of power is exclusion.

Smaller and vulnerable economies are routinely expected to absorb the collateral damage of these fractured trade policies, facing sudden capital outflows and inflationary pressures driven by decisions made far beyond their borders.

By contrast, the institutional machinery in the Global South is built on a foundation of inclusiveness and connectivity. The NDB was established not to replace the existing global financial system, but to correct historical imbalances and bridge the wide infrastructure gaps across the developing world. Traditional multilateral lenders often imposed stringent, politically punitive conditionalities that compromised local sovereignty and destabilized domestic societies.

The NDB offers a financing model centered on tangible infrastructure and sustainable development without political interference.

When nations locked out of conventional markets gain access to these independent credit lines, the unipolar monopoly of Western finance naturally begins to fray.

The implications of this model extend well beyond infrastructure development. Membership in alternative multilateral institutions offers developing nations greater flexibility in managing macroeconomic risks.

For decades, dependence on a single global reserve currency and centralized lending hubs meant that emerging economies absorbed every shock generated by foreign monetary authorities. Diversified sources of financing, and the possibility of lending in local currencies, provide a structural cushion to mitigate the risk of sudden debt distress and shield domestic markets from exchange rate volatility. It is a sophisticated mechanism for risk management, allowing sovereign states to conduct trade and development planning with greater predictability.

Zimbabwe's decision also reflects a broader trend across Africa, Asia and Latin America. Increasingly, governments are unwilling to tie their economic fortunes to a single, Western-centric system that leaves them acutely vulnerable to unilateral policy shocks, arbitrary sanctions, and sudden currency shifts.

Participation in alternative multilateral networks enables these states to insulate their domestic markets from external volatility, ensuring that local development plans are driven by national priorities rather than foreign oversight.

Moreover, this institutional expansion highlights the growing maturity of South-South cooperation. For generations, development finance was used as a tool of geopolitical compliance, ensuring that recipient nations toe a specific ideological line.

The emergence of alternative credit sources introduces a healthy element of competition and choice into the global marketplace. Sovereign states can now shop for development partners, negotiate terms that align with their domestic growth targets, and integrate more fully into regional and global supply chains without sacrificing their political autonomy.

Ultimately, the widening gap between Western economic fragmentation and the institutional growth of the Global South will dictate the contours of the global order in the 21st century.

While Western policymakers persist in building protective silos and deploying restrictive measures, the rest of the world is quietly constructing a parallel, resilient framework for international cooperation.
Zimbabwe joining the NDB is a clear reminder that when global financial institutions are weaponized for political leverage, emerging economies will inevitably build other doors. The center of economic gravity is shifting, and the future belongs to nations that choose open connectivity over defensive containment.

The author is a strategist and political analyst based in Karachi, Pakistan.
The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

If you have a specific expertise, or would like to share your thought about our stories, then send us your writings at opinion@chinadaily.com.cn, and comment@chinadaily.com.cn.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

BRICS Trade Ministers Meeting in India: further momentum for South-South cooperation
The meeting of BRICS Trade Ministers in India’s Jaipur concluded on August 7, 2026 with the main focus of discussions directed at WTO reform, supply chain resilience and support for small and medium-sized companies. With respect to the WTO, BRICS members emphasized the importance of the organization as the cornerstone of the international trading system as well as due consideration that is needed for special treatment of developing economies in international trade. As regards small and medium sized businesses, discussions focused on rendering financing more accessible to SMEs via the proposed BRICS invoice-discounting mechanism[1]. BRICS representatives also discussed a work plan on BRICS’ shared understanding of global value chains, as well as the modalities of cooperation in the sphere of digitally delivered cross-border services[2].

Along with the discussions of mutual economic cooperation, participants further explored the recent trends in intra-BRICS trade dynamics, including with respect to the new members of the BRICS core. In particular, the United Arab Emirates increased its non-oil trade turnover with BRICS in 2025 by more than 28% from USD 243 bn to USD 312 bn[3]. Overall, the share of BRICS nations in UAE’s total non-oil foreign trade reached 31% in 2025; BRICS countries were also the source of 34% of the UAE’s imports, the destination for 23% of its non-oil exports, and accounted for 28% of its re-exports during the same period[4].

Similar trends of rising trade with BRICS are also observed in Egypt – according to the country’s Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade, in 2025 the trade turnover with BRICS increased by nearly 19% – from USD 45 bn in 2024 to USD 53.5 bn in 2025. This growth was primarily driven by the surge in Egypt’s exports to BRICS partners by more than 45% from USD 9.45 bn in 2024 to USD 13.8 billion in 2025[5].

For his part, Indonesia’s representative at the meeting, Trade Minister Budi Santoso, called for “combining robust multilateral cooperation with practical trade partnerships to achieve tangible results”[6]. In particular, on the sidelines of the meeting in Jaipur, Budi Santoso held a meeting with his Brazilian counterpart to discuss the possibility of launching a preferential trade accord between Indonesia and Mercosur after earlier efforts to create a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) lost momentum[7]. Also in Jaipur, India and South Africa discussed the signing of Terms of Reference (ToRs) for India-SACU PTA and early conclusion of negotiations on this trade accord[8]. This emphasis on building trade accords targeting more open markets was further reflected in the priorities outlined at the meeting by the UAE – an economy that is currently one of the most active drivers of trade and environmental accords on the international arena. Since September 2021, the UAE “has concluded 38 agreements with economies across Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas, with 18 in force – including agreements with fellow BRICS members India and Indonesia”[9].

The positive trends in intra-BRICS trade lend further support to our views expressed since 2024 on the rising role of South-South trade in the global economy (“The Great Reconfiguration”[10]). For the intensifying South-South trade cooperation to persist into the coming years BRICS+ economies will need to complement the measures discussed thus far at the ministerial level by more emphatic and large-scale undertakings that target closer trade policy coordination (including within the WTO) and the facilitation of concrete trade alliances that may involve not only individual economies but also regional blocs. The upcoming BRICS summit in September 2026 will reflect some of the advances made in the ministerial level, with further progress in the sphere of actual trade accords and region-to-region agreements across the Global South largely dependent on the evolution of the BRICS+ format.

[1] https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2296367&reg=48&lang=2
[2] https://en.antaranews.com/news/426145/ri-calls-on-brics-members-to-collaborate-amid-global-trade-shift
[3] https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/brics/uae-participates-in-2026-brics-trade-ministers-meeting-in-jaipur
[4] https://sharjah24.ae/en/Articles/2026/08/08/d72
[5] https://sis.gov.eg/en/media-center/events/egypts-participation-in-the-16th-brics-trade-ministers-meeting/
[6] https://en.antaranews.com/news/426145/ri-calls-on-brics-members-to-collaborate-amid-global-trade-shift
[7] https://en.antaranews.com/amp/news/426189/indonesia-brazil-consider-establishing-indonesia-mecosur-pta
[8] https://ddnews.gov.in/en/india-south-africa-to-expand-cooperation-in-critical-minerals-pharmaceuticals-piyush-goyal/
[9] https://sharjah24.ae/en/Articles/2026/08/08/d72
[10] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/the-great-reconfiguration/

Russia
Source: eng.globalaffairs.ru

Financial sovereignty has gradually moved from specialists’ attention to the forefront of strategic economic discussions. Over the past decade, BRICS countries have made substantial progress in developing alternative settlement mechanisms, expanding the use of national currencies in bilateral trade, and strengthening institutional frameworks for financial cooperation. These achievements are tangible and significant.

Yet, as the transformation of the global economy continues, new priorities are emerging. The structure of cross-border economic activity has changed. While interstate and corporate transactions remain vital, a growing share of cross-border payments now involve individuals: tourists, students, medical travelers, remote workers, freelancers, and small entrepreneurs. Importantly, these actors are not only beneficiaries but drivers of economic integration.

The existing international financial architecture was designed in a different era and for different purposes. Serving the global economy, it has been primarily focused on large-scale institutional and trade-related flows. Its retail dimension—money transfers of people moving across borders—has received far less attention.

This gap is becoming increasingly relevant for BRICS.

With nearly half of the world’s population and a growing share in global GDP, BRICS countries have both the opportunity and incentive to extend financial integration to reach ordinary citizens.

The task is to complement existing systems with new mechanisms that would comply with contemporary human mobility and economic exchange.

Why the Present International Financial Infrastructure Is No Longer Fully Effective

The international payment systems that dominate today were developed during the period of unipolarity and relative geopolitical stability. They have facilitated decades of global economic growth. However, the world has changed. Emerging economies now account for a significantly larger share of global production, consumption, and trade. New economic corridors have appeared across Eurasia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

Cross-border transactions have become more varied. Alongside traditional corporate financial flows, there is a substantial volume of citizen-to-citizen and citizen-to-business transactions. A student paying tuition abroad, a tourist purchasing services in another country, a freelancer receiving payment from an overseas client are not marginal financial activities; these money transfers amount to hundreds of billions of dollars annually and involve hundreds of millions of people. However, individuals often face practical difficulties in getting access to their domestic financial resources while traveling or doing business abroad. These difficulties are a natural consequence of a system that no longer fully aligns with the realities of a multipolar and highly mobile global economy.

Meanwhile, recent technological developments have demonstrated that many of these difficulties can be overcome. National payment systems such as Russia’s MIR, India’s UPI, China’s digital payment ecosystems, and Brazil’s PIX have proven efficient and secure for large-scale retail payments processed within domestic contexts. What is lacking is a framework for connecting these national systems across borders in a seamless and user-friendly manner.

Some digital platforms demonstrate high technical feasibility for cross-border transactions. For example, while staying in the United Arab Emirates, users of the Russian Yandex application can access transportation services abroad with payments processed through their domestic accounts in Russia and currency conversion occurring automatically in the background. This shows that the technological barriers to broader integration are much lower than is often assumed. The challenge is not technological but institutional: it lies in the lack of agreement on common standards, settlement procedures, and governance mechanisms.

From States to Citizens’ Financial Connectivity: The Rationale for a BRICS Card
BRICS countries’ financial cooperation has been focused on state-level issues: local-currency trade settlements, alternative payment messaging systems, reserve diversification, and development finance. These efforts are essential and should continue, but further integration may require an additional focus—one that would bring the benefits of financial cooperation directly to citizens. This is where the idea of a BRICS Card becomes relevant.

The rationale is straightforward. Economic integration is sustained not by governments alone but also by millions of daily interactions between individuals: tourists spending money, students paying for accommodation, entrepreneurs purchasing services, workers sending remittances. When these interactions are hindered by financial friction, the full potential of economic integration remains unrealized.

A practical response to this challenge would be the creation of a common BRICS payment ecosystem centered on interoperable national payment systems and a shared BRICS Card or digital wallet framework.

Such an ecosystem would not seek to replace national currencies, nor would it require a supranational central bank. It would enable citizens of participating countries to access their domestic financial resources when traveling or conducting business across the BRICS space, using local currencies and domestic banking relationships. A BRICS Card would be the visible, user-friendly instrument that makes this connectivity tangible.

The core principle is interoperability, not uniformity. Each participating country would retain full control over its monetary policy, banking regulation, and financial supervision. The common layer would handle the automatic conversion, settlement, and clearing of transactions according to agreed rules. For an individual, using a BRICS Card would be similar to using a domestic payment card at home—familiar, convenient, and predictable.

This approach has several advantages: it is built on existing infrastructure rather than requiring costly new systems; it respects national sovereignty while enhancing connectivity; and it focuses on practical utility rather than geopolitical symbolism. The BRICS Card is not a political statement; it is a practical tool.

Potential Benefits for Key Economic Sectors

A common payment mechanism embodied in a BRICS Card could have positive effects for further growth and smooth operation of several sectors.

Tourism and Business Travel. BRICS countries include some of the world’s most popular tourist destinations and major sources of outbound tourism. A BRICS Card would facilitate seamless payment access for travelers, reducing administrative burdens and making travel more convenient, potentially encouraging greater flows of visitors within the BRICS space.

International Education. Thousands of students from BRICS countries study in other BRICS nations. Tuition fees, living expenses, and family remittances all require cross-border payment instruments. A unified BRICS Card would simplify the necessary procedures for students and educational institutions alike.

Medical Travel. Healthcare services are an increasingly important area of cooperation, with patients traveling to specialized clinics across BRICS countries. At moments when financial certainty is particularly important, having a reliable BRICS Card that provides direct and reliable access to domestic funds would be a tangible benefit.

Digital Services and Freelancing. The growth of remote work and digitally delivered services has created new opportunities for professionals to offer their skills across borders. A BRICS Card would reduce friction for these workers, allowing them to focus on their activities rather than on payment logistics.

Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs). For smaller businesses, international expansion is often complicated by payment-related challenges. A BRICS Card would lower these barriers, making it easier for SMEs to access customers and partners in other BRICS countries, thereby broadening the base of economic participation.

Existing Foundations for Creating a BRICS Card

The creation of a BRICS Card would not require a single dramatic leap. A phased approach is both more realistic and more likely to succeed.

The initial stage could embrace tourism and business travel among a limited number of participating countries, and be based on the use of existing national payment systems and bilateral agreements on settlement procedures. The BRICS Card could first be issued as a co-branded card linked to national systems like MIR, UPI, or PIX. The next stage could expand to include educational payments and medical services. Later stages could incorporate digital commerce, freelancing, and small-business transactions.

The technical foundation for this already exists. Russia’s MIR system, India’s UPI, China’s digital payment platforms, Brazil’s PIX—are all proven technologies capable of handling large volumes of transactions securely and efficiently. The task is to establish common technical standards, agree on settlement rules, and develop a governance framework that would ensure transparency, security, and consumer protection for the BRICS Card.

There is also the necessary institutional foundation for issuing and operating a BRICS Card. The New Development Bank has accumulated ample experience in facilitating multilateral financial cooperation. Commercial banks with cross-border operations are increasingly active in BRICS markets.

A BRICS Card would not need to be exclusive. It could operate alongside existing international payment networks, offering an additional opportunity for those who would like to use it. The goal is not to create a closed system but to expand the range of available options, thereby enhancing consumer choice and financial resilience.

Addressing Challenges and Potential Concerns

Issuing and operating a BRICS Card is a challenging task that may naturally raise concerns.
Technological feasibility. As noted above, the necessary technology already exists in the form of national payment systems that process billions of transactions annually. The missing element is not new technology but agreement on interoperability standards—a matter of coordination, not invention.
Regulatory and legal harmonization. Different countries have different rules regarding banking, data protection, anti-money laundering, and consumer rights. These differences are real but manageable. International payment systems have successfully navigated such differences for decades. The same principles of mutual recognition and common minimum standards could apply to the BRICS Card.
Geopolitical considerations. Some BRICS members face sanctions or other external restrictions. Others do not. The BRICS Card would be designed as a voluntary, complementary layer of infrastructure. It would not require countries to choose between existing and new systems. Participation would be based on mutual benefit, not political alignment.

Trust and security. Any payment system must be reliable, transparent, and secure. This requires robust governance, clear dispute resolution mechanisms, and strong data protection. BRICS countries already have regulatory institutions capable of providing such oversight for the BRICS Card. The challenge is to coordinate them effectively.

None of these concerns is insurmountable. They are the same types of challenges that every successful international payment network has faced and overcome. What is required is sustained dialogue and a willingness to find practical solutions.

The proposal for a BRICS Card is not a grand geopolitical declaration. It is a practical response to a real and growing need. The world has changed. Patterns of human mobility and cross-border economic activity have diversified. Financial infrastructure must evolve accordingly—not through confrontation with existing systems, but through addition of new, complementary mechanisms.

The BRICS Card as an new mechanism would not replace national currencies, challenge monetary sovereignty, or seek to undermine any existing financial network. It would simply make life easier for hundreds of millions of people: students, tourists, medical travelers, freelancers, entrepreneurs acting across the BRICS space.

The technological base is available. The economic rationale is clear. The institutional foundations are already being laid. What remains is the political will to move forward—not in opposition to anything, but in commitment to the shared interest in deeper, more inclusive, and more practical economic integration.

For BRICS, which collectively represents nearly half of humanity, taking this step would be a natural progression from trade settlements to human connectivity. That is what economic integration is ultimately about.