Russia
Source: mid.ru

Mr Minister,

My dear friend, colleagues, friends,

This is our first face-to-face meeting this year; we have had several telephone conversations before which are always substantive and detailed. I have no doubt that we will have even more opportunities this year to communicate and to prepare additional decisions for upcoming contacts between our leaders which have already been planned. We will review this matter in detail today.

I fully agree with you that the foundations of international relations are facing the most severe challenges. Just look at what happened in Latin America, Venezuela, at the beginning of the year, and what is happening now in the Middle East. The Ukraine crisis, which the West tried to artificially create in order, as it claimed, to inflict a strategic defeat on the Russian Federation, is now being used, primarily by the Europeans, to begin nurturing plans to create a new aggressive bloc in western Eurasia and to drag the Ukrainian regime into it clearly with the objective of directing this new entity against the Russian Federation.

Highly dangerous games continue unabated in eastern Eurasia as well, including the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea. The situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the space that has for many years remained a place of cooperation and neighbourliness – I’m referring to the ASEAN-centric space - is being escalated as well. Attempts are being made to break it apart by creating small-geometry and bloc-like entities in order to contain both the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, which share borders with this most important region that is part of Eurasia.
Our vast continent needs to be watched over at all times. I am confident that we will be able to substantively discuss joint practical steps today, both in line with the initiatives put forward by the President of the People’s Republic of China on global security and other areas, and in line with President Vladimir Putin’s initiative to form common Eurasian continental security architecture.
I believe our meeting is taking place at the right time. Thank you for the invitation. I stand committed to engaging in concrete and productive work.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: For the past 20 years, you have essentially been arguing that the US rules-based order is essentially a fiction masking the American hegemony, and that the United States has abandoned itself. But here is what the world looks like right now, and I want to make a tie to one of the central themes that we talked about last year: multipolarity. The world looks like this: the United States is bombing Iran, it is blockading the Strait of Hormuz, it has seized a Latin American leader, it is threatening to annex part of a NATO country, Greenland, and is threatening to leave NATO. Is this the multipolar world that Russia was actually expecting? 
Sergey Lavrov: Diplomats and politicians must base their actions not on expectations, but on the realities that exist at any given historical moment. In truth, a “rules-based order” has never existed beyond being a slogan. Since this term came into use over a decade ago, we have repeatedly asked for a clear compilation of the “rules” that are supposed to underpin this order and be accepted by all. No such document exists.
I have given examples, including the case of Kosovo, where independence was justified on the basis of the right to self-determination. Yet when it comes to Crimea – and later Donbass – the same principle is blatantly dismissed, with emphasis shifting instead to territorial integrity. These decisions are made on a case-by-case basis.
Even during Donald Trump’s previous presidency, his administration uniquely recognised Western Sahara as part of Morocco, without requiring negotiations or further process. Negotiations still continue, but for the United States, the matter was settled.
Israel has long occupied the Golan Heights, and the UN Security Council adopts resolutions on the issue every six months. During his first term, Donald Trump declared the Golan Heights to be Israeli territory. Following subsequent developments in Gaza and the West Bank, Israel now controls not only the Golan Heights – within the boundaries recognised by the United States – but also an expanded buffer zone that was previously under UN supervision, effectively increasing the territory for many square kilometres. This is no longer discussed.
Similarly, the situation in the West Bank is disregarded. No one is talking about the Israeli leadership openly stating that a Palestinian state will never be established, while others continue to repeat, almost ritualistically, that the only fair resolution to the Middle East conflict is the creation of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however, rejects this possibility.
Donald Trump proposed a plan for the Gaza Strip, which was brought before the UN Security Council. The plan called for the disarmament of Hamas, the deployment of stabilisation forces, and, on that basis, the reconstruction of Gaza’s infrastructure – housing and social services. Later, reports emerged suggesting plans to transform the area into a kind of “riviera,” a major development project built around tourism, sunshine, and yachts.
When this draft resolution was submitted to the UN Security Council, we, together with our Chinese counterparts, asked how it aligned with the decisions that both the Security Council and the UN General Assembly had unanimously adopted regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state. We were told that it did not, and that it was a different matter. It was highly unusual for the Security Council to introduce a new initiative on an issue that has been under UN consideration for some eighty years, and on which numerous resolutions already exist, without even referencing the Organisation’s prior decisions. This put us in a difficult position – and yet, all our partners, including the Palestinians and the majority of Arab states – urged us not to block the resolution. As a result, our Chinese partners and we chose to abstain, deciding to give it a chance, particularly since the Arab countries were keen on this approach. While large-scale fighting has subsided, the ceasefire remains fragile.
Furthermore, the situation in Lebanon has become more prominent, where UN Security Council resolutions concerning the status of territories south of the Litani River have been violated for many years. Amidst the developments in the Strait of Hormuz, I believe it is important not to overlook the Palestinian issue. Meanwhile, Syria is also experiencing highly complex developments. A number of Israeli leaders, including, as I recall, Benjamin Netanyahu, have stated that we are seeing the emergence of a “new Israeli state,” even referencing the inclusion of surrounding territories.
What I am saying is that politicians and diplomats cannot afford to focus solely on whatever dominates headlines or breaking news on television and social media simply because someone wants it to be presented as the primary issue of the moment. It would be deeply regrettable if the historic UN resolution calling for the creation of two states – a Jewish state and an Arab state of Palestine – were effectively disregarded and dismantled. This directly ties into the issue of international law.
In the case of UN decisions regarding Palestinian statehood, there is no distinction between the international legal norms that mandate its creation and the rules applied by Western countries. One approach is taken when convenient, and the opposite when it is not. In this sense, a ‘rules-based world’ becomes synonymous with the rule of a ‘hegemon’ and a ‘universal emperor.’
How does all of this align with expectations of a multipolar world? In my view, we are not even halfway there; we are only at the very beginning. This period will be historically arduous, as it will require abandoning many ingrained habits. Some will need to relinquish the practice of imposing their will on others and punishing them, while others will have to stop relying on and acting under the protection of their ‘patrons’ and ‘fathers’ and avoiding responsibility for their own actions. Many nations will also need to abandon their habit of trusting partners who have repeatedly deceived them.
I have been reading extensively on the trends shaping a multipolar world and polycentric world order; such a system is beginning to take shape and becoming an objective reality. The laws of globalisation, largely introduced into modern civilisational life by the United States, were based on principles such as free markets, fair competition, the protection of property, the presumption of innocence, and, above all, the removal of barriers in trade and economic relations, and essentially in all other spheres. However, this [model of] globalisation has now effectively come to an end.
Beginning in the period of US President Joe Biden’s administration, we have witnessed increasing fragmentation, regionalisation, and the rise of trade wars, which the United States is now actively using as tools to preserve and reinforce its former dominance. These trends stand in stark contrast to the principles of globalisation. This signals the emergence of a new reality.
It is therefore unsurprising that an increasing number of subregional structures are exploring ways to shield themselves from dependence on the US dollar, which has now been turned into a tool of war. I clearly recall how, during Joe Biden’s presidency, Donald Trump – who was in opposition then – strongly criticised Biden and his team for undermining confidence in the dollar and its reputation by using it as an instrument of sanctions. Trump and his supporters pointed out that when the United States abandoned the gold standard, it reassured the world that the dollar would not simply serve American interests but would function as a global public good, independent of political pressure or punitive measures. They presented it as the civilisation’s common good – that was the narrative.
Throughout Joe Biden’s term in office, Donald Trump recalled the United States’ promises to the world while criticising Biden for undermining the credibility of the dollar. Upon becoming president, Donald Trump himself warned that he would “punish” BRICS countries if they moved away from the dollar. As the Russian saying goes, the place does not honour the man, but the man does the place.
BRICS is not alone in exploring options for establishing independent payment systems, insurance and reinsurance mechanisms, and direct banking channels that are no longer reliant on the West. Although the New Development Bank was created within the BRICS framework, it still, regrettably, operates on principles rooted in the Bretton Woods system, which are now seen as outdated.
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, upon returning to the presidency in Brazil, revitalised CELAC and, among other initiatives, proposed that it engage in the matters we are now talking about – namely, developing independent mechanisms for business, trade, and investment that cannot be negatively affected externally.
At the same time, under Donald Trump, the United States has responded sharply to any attempts to move away from the dollar. Can such pressure be considered freedom of choice? Clearly not. For objective reasons, the dismantling of the previous model of globalisation will continue. The economic growth of China and India is already significantly outpacing that of the United States. In terms of purchasing power parity, China has taken the lead, and this trajectory is likely to persist. The factual economic, trade, and financial indicators that define global influence are shifting accordingly.
Efforts that the United States is making to artificially delay the redistribution of quotas within the International Monetary Fund and to preserve its veto power do not change this reality. If institutions like the IMF and the World Bank were to align their governance structures, including vote distribution, with the actual balance of power in the global economy and finance, US hegemonic dominance within the Bretton Woods system would have long come to an end.
Let us not get ahead of ourselves and claim that everyone had already foreseen a multipolar world and a new balance, only for Donald Trump to arrive and demonstrate what he thinks about it within just a year. The process has not even fully begun. This is a long historical era, and we must rely on objective trends, including the emergence of new powerful centres of economic growth, cutting-edge technologies, and financial influence. With all of this inevitably comes political weight.
In 2020, President of Russia Vladimir Putin proposed holding a summit with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. However, the pandemic intervened. It is therefore difficult to assess whether the leaders of the United States, France, and United Kingdom were politically ready for such a meeting at the time, although China expressed its support for the idea. I have recently recalled this initiative in one of my speeches. In fact, we have always supported organising constructive meetings, but it is hardly realistic today to expect a balanced approach from our current counterparts in Paris, London, Berlin, and Brussels. Their public statements have placed them in positions from which it is extremely difficult to retreat without significant political costs such as the loss of their voters’ trust and self-incrimination as politicians who do not care about their countries’ future.
There is the G20, which includes virtually all BRICS countries, as well as the G7 and their allies (roughly an even balance, with ten BRICS countries and ten G7 members). There are also other international formats where major powers find themselves in the same place at the same time. In most cases, responsible leaders usually take advantage of such opportunities for direct contact and informal exchanges, which is especially important in a world where circumstances can change overnight. So, some are describing current developments as World War III, arguing that these are the forms global conflicts take today. It is not for us to make such judgments; that is the task of historians.
For us, a country that has endured numerous wars, especially the tragedy of World War II and the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the primary criterion remains the protection of human life and preventing it from being in danger. I do not know whether you heard about this or not, but even this fundamental, genetic principle of ours is sometimes questioned. For example, the head of European diplomacy, Kaja Kallas, has recently claimed that Russia had attacked other countries nineteen times over the past century, some of them several times. And this without counting Africa, she said.
Personally, I remain calm. As long as there are people like this in European countries, we have hopes that their people – historically civilised, educated, intelligent people – will know the true value of such leaders. Eventually, when they aspire of leading a pole in the multipolar polycentric world, I believe they will be given their due.
Question: There is a lot to unpack, and I hope that I can frame my next question so that it will include a lot of themes that you mentioned. You mentioned that the United States uses the dollar as a tool of war; you mentioned BRICS, China, and even Europe.
Here is what comes to mind. In light of your latest trip to Beijing, I believe the annual trade between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China exceeds $200 billion, and I am sorry that I have to express it in dollars, because that is the figure that I came across. You export a majority of your crude oil to China. While you were in China, you said that Russia was in a position to fill in the energy gap. You buy components from China to support your defence industry. You settle in yuan. I understand the strategic relations, but I am wondering if this borders on economic dependency. How those relations that you have with China are different from those – in terms of structure – that you had with Europe that you have been criticising for many years saying it was a trap?
Sergey Lavrov: President of Russia Vladimir Putin addressed this issue long ago, when Russia’s relations with the European Union were still structured and intensive. At the time, Western narratives increasingly claimed that Europe – with its network of pipelines transiting Ukraine and later projects such as TurkStream gas pipeline, Blue Stream gas pipeline, and Nord Stream pipeline – was becoming dependent on Russian gas. President Putin was speaking at a forum when he was asked about this, and he posed a counterquestion as to whether it troubled anyone that Russia, by building fixed pipelines, was in turn increasing its own dependence on Europe. Unlike flexible LNG carriers that can be sent anywhere depending on the current situation in the centres, pipelines imply long-term pricing. As President Vladimir Putin noted, suppliers depend on buyers no less than buyers depend on suppliers. As it turned out, it was unfortunate.
This was further underscored by Nord Stream explosions, when nobody depended on anyone. Certain actors stepped in deciding they did not want gas us trading with Germans and with Europeans via Germans. They would be the ones supplying their gas. So, the dependence issue is complicated.
This also applies to long-term contracts. At a certain stage, Brussels began insisting that member states abandon long-term supply agreements in favour of spot market trading, arguing that such contracts were not sufficiently market-oriented. Every deal must be based on the current conditions, they believed. The speculative nature of spot markets did not concern anyone, though everyone present here know very well how the spot market was developing, for example, during the war in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz: it calmed down on the weekends only for developments to follow. We understand this very well.
However, when Europe rejected long-term contracts, it suffered, too. Today, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and other EC officials emphasise that they have reduced or nearly eliminated dependence on Russian gas and oil imports, or will do so in just a few months. This is presented as a political achievement. You know how the global economy works, and there is probably some statistics somewhere (though it is never shown) that the gas Europe buys from the United States instead of Russia – particularly liquefied natural gas – has become significantly more expensive as compared to previous pipeline deliveries from Russia under long-term contracts.
In contrast, Russia’s relations with the People’s Republic of China are balanced. Trade is close to parity, with a slight surplus on the Russian side, and is not limited to oil and gas. However, pipeline infrastructure in China (there are now plans to build another pipeline) supports its long-term economic planning. China has planned economy, where oil and gas price predictability is essential. Accordingly, long-term contracts remain a priority, unlike in Europe, which does not seem to be interested. Yes, we depend on supplies, but we are interested in them. It is more profitable for us to redirect gas from western Siberia to the People’s Republic of China: the prices are good, and the buyer is very reliable; there are never any disruptions, just as there are never any disruptions in our supplies.
On top of oil and gas, Russia and China enjoy extensive cooperation on nuclear energy and other advanced technologies, such as space. I do not see this as unilateral dependence.
Concerns about dependence perhaps arise when dealing with partners that have already deceived you, and more than once. This is a matter to ponder about. In relations with China, no such issues have emerged in recent history. I believe the diplomacy between the two countries is at its peak. During my recent trip to Beijing, I met with President of China Xi Jinping, who reaffirmed this commitment. I conveyed President Vladimir Putin’s sentiment, too.
Sometimes we are asked why Russia and China do not form a military alliance. There are also political analysts who argue that such a step is necessary, claiming that the situation is moving toward war. These views are increasingly voiced. We have addressed this before. The official documents endorsed by the leaders of both countries state clearly that Russia-China relations are of a higher quality, deeper, and more reliable than traditional military alliances. We can talk about this for a long time and with numerous examples, but this is the feeling shared by the Russians and the Chinese both in terms of personal exchanges across all spheres and between the leaderships.
Question: Mr Minister, I would like to slightly shift gears. Six days ago, Viktor Orbán – arguably Russia’s most reliable advocate within the European Union – lost his reelection campaign in Hungary. His successor, Péter Magyar, said that he was ready to unblock a €90 billion package of aid to Ukraine. What is Russia’s approach, and what is your evaluation of Russia’s losing its most effective veto in Europe?
Sergey Lavrov: I would not overestimate the developments that have taken place in Hungary, nor those that may unfold in connection with elections in other European Union and NATO member states. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, when accused of being pro-Russian, has repeatedly emphasised – and we fully agree – that he is a pro-Hungarian politician.
This wave of labelling leaders as “pro-Russian” appears aimed, above all, at obscuring and delaying recognition of the deep-rooted contradictions that exist and are intensifying between nationally elected governments in EU countries and the Brussels-based bureaucracy, which is appointed through internal arrangements rather than direct elections – much as in the United Kingdom, where, once a prime minister leaves, the next one is chosen during a meeting behind closed doors.
Any bureaucratic system, as Tsarist and Soviet eras show, tends to replicate, consolidate and expand its influence over time. Just look at the US Agency for International Development, whose activities came under scrutiny when the Trump administration returned to the White House a year ago. Such bureaucracy does have some norms, and not just abstract rules the world order is based upon. The European Union has an extensive body of acquis communautaire, which defines procedures in great detail.
There is a growing view among politicians, legal experts, and political analysts that the actions of the current European Commission have gone far beyond its formally mandated powers. It first arose during the pandemic, as you very well know, in connection with large-scale vaccine procurement processes, which did not comply with established requirements and standards, including those on the vaccine quality.
This is the standoff. It was precisely against this bureaucracy that Viktor Orbán raised his voice. He never said, “I demand that we all become friends with Russia.” Not once. Never.
Regarding the 90 billion (which they initially failed to steal from Russian funds – our state reserves illegally seized in Europe – then came up with this loan that won’t even be secured by the stolen reserves), Orbán said he would sign on to the decision as soon as Vladimir Zelensky opened the Druzhba oil pipeline. Zelensky still hasn’t reopened it. He will lie that the pipeline is damaged, I have no doubt about it. This story has been dragging on for two months now. And how long did it take Orbán and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to literally force the European Commission to “kindly ask” Zelensky to allow EU experts to come and see whether the Druzhba pipeline really was damaged? First, it took a couple of weeks just to reach an agreement. And then they were never given access to the pipeline. So how can you expect Orbán to like the current regime that rules Ukraine and, from Kiev, governs the rest of the European Union, including the European Commission? Therefore, I wouldn’t accuse him of pushing a “pro-Russian” agenda.
President of Russia Vladimir Putin never refuses contact if a counterpart from any country makes the first move. French President Emmanuel Macron proposed a visit in February 2022, didn’t he? He came. Naftali Bennett, when he was Prime Minister of Israel? He came. He brought a very interesting idea, which he later took to Kiev. And unlike Moscow, Kiev sent him back to West Jerusalem with it. Many other leaders have visited us – Viktor Orbán, Robert Fico. We never turn down the opportunity. That doesn’t mean that anyone who considers it normal for the leader of a state, large or small, to communicate with their colleagues should become some kind of pariah.
Take US President Donald Trump. We have many disagreements with the current American administration, especially on ongoing practical matters. No sanctions have been lifted since the Biden era, and they still haven’t even returned our diplomatic property. Our companies – Lukoil and Rosneft – have been hit by new sanctions announced by the Trump administration itself, which has made no secret of its goal: US dominance in global energy markets. Venezuela, the attack in the Persian Gulf, and, incidentally, the talk of American companies seeking to buy the European-owned TurkStream pipeline – all of that is part of the same picture. They are already negotiating to buy the transit pipeline that runs through Ukrainian territory. The goal is energy dominance.
Nevertheless, the moment has come for a discussion about how the Americans see the future of our economic relations. Because they keep saying: once things are settled with Ukraine, we’ll have unlimited scope for mutually beneficial cooperation. But despite all this, unlike Joe Biden, who banned all contacts and demanded that everyone else isolate Russia, President Donald Trump, upon returning to the Oval Office, immediately advocated for dialogue. We met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Riyadh in February 2025 and continue to communicate. We met in Alaska, and then I met with Rubio again at the UN General Assembly. We also maintain contacts on other fronts, including on the Ukrainian issue, as you know. Many questions arise.
There are also examples where agreements seem to have been reached, as in Alaska, but something doesn’t work out. Again, envoys from Brussels and nearby European capitals arrive, and Ukrainians travel to Europe, having whispered discussions there. Nevertheless, we are not refusing to talk, and neither are the Americans. We have serious issues at hand.
You began this conversation by focusing on three events. But these three events are increasingly taking on a global dimension, because it is becoming clear to everyone that each of them has consequences. Consequences that suggest, among other things, that one of the participants is pursuing some other goal. Where they declared a fight against drug trafficking, they want oil. Where they declared the protection of the rights of the heroic Ukrainian people, they also want something else – this time in the sphere of security and the long-term containment of Russia.
Currently, a global dimension is evident in virtually every significant process of this kind. This is also part of the formation of that very multipolar world, which will certainly be complex. When the time comes to formalise this multipolar world within some kind of “new UN” or through reform of the existing global Organisation, there will be a latent – and perhaps not so latent – struggle over who can claim the title of “pole” and how that status will be formalised. Will it be by permanent membership in the Security Council, if the UN system remains (which we firmly advocate), or by some other means? And when it is de facto accepted that there is a group of countries that deserve not so much special rights as a special responsibility for the future of the world, then, of course, we will either expand the UN Security Council (we are prepared for this) or some other form will be found.
The G20 was created primarily to provide a platform for leading actors in the global economy to negotiate in a narrow circle, but transparently for the rest. But to a large extent, the G20 compensates for the lack of progress on UN Security Council reform. Because the G20 also discusses geopolitical issues, and countries that would like to be on the Security Council, given their geopolitical weight, partially satisfy that absolutely legitimate aspiration within the G20.
There will be more and more such frameworks. BRICS was mentioned. It is also a structure with several future – or current – poles. But BRICS itself, as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, can have both national and regional poles. Everything will depend on how the real situation unfolds – in the economy, in politics, and in security. And, of course, on which of the leaders at this historical stage will stand at the helm of these emerging poles, and to what extent they can recognise their responsibility for ensuring their coexistence.

Russia
Source: en.kremlin.ru


Vladimir Putin held talks in the Kremlin with President of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto, who is in Russia on a working visit.

The agenda of the talks includes the current state and prospects for strengthening the Russian-Indonesian strategic partnership, as well as current international and regional issues.

* * *
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr President, friends,

First of all, thank you for accepting our invitation and coming to Moscow.

My dear friend, I am very pleased that our contacts are regular and underscore the special nature of our relations. We have recently signed a declaration to this effect, and it is already taking on practical form.

This strategic nature is manifested, above all, in the economic sphere. Last year, our trade grew by 12.5 percent. Regrettably, at the beginning of this year, there was some adjustment, but our intergovernmental commission is actively working. I hope that your visit will help us find the necessary solutions to ensure stability and renewed growth this year.

Our colleagues on both sides as well as you and I have repeatedly identified the most promising areas of cooperation: energy, space, agriculture, industrial cooperation, and pharmaceuticals.
We attach great importance to developing humanitarian ties, including in culture and education. Of course, our foreign ministries also maintain close and active coordination across international platforms.

Indonesia has become a full member of BRICS, which opens up additional opportunities for cooperation, including between Indonesia and the Eurasian Economic Union.

My dear friend, we are very glad to see you. Welcome.

President of the Republic of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto (retranslated): Thank you very much, Your Excellency, Mr President.

I would like to express my sincere appreciation for your willingness to meet with me on such short notice. I am truly grateful that you were able to take time out of your busy schedule for this meeting.
Although only a few months have passed since our previous meeting, I have already engaged with numerous Russian delegations visiting Jakarta and held a number of meetings in Moscow. Prior to today’s discussion, I also met with representatives of Russian government agencies and companies, and I believe these exchanges were productive.

The primary purpose of my visit today is to express our sincere gratitude to you personally, as well as to the Government of the Russian Federation, for the support extended to the Republic of Indonesia, particularly for the swift timeframe in which Indonesia was able to join BRICS. I would also like to convey my appreciation for your personal support on issues of key importance to Indonesia.

We are already witnessing tangible progress across nearly all areas of cooperation that we discussed during our previous meeting. At the same time, certain areas require additional coordination, and I stand ready to be personally involved in order to accelerate the implementation of these projects. This applies, first of all, to financial transactions, where I am also prepared to take all necessary steps to expedite the process to the fullest extent possible.

One of the key objectives of my visit today is, of course, to consult with you on the current geopolitical situation. We recognise Russia’s significant and constructive role in shaping today’s geopolitical landscape, particularly amid the prevailing uncertainties.

In this context, it is especially important for us to engage in joint consultations, exchange views on future developments, and identify priority areas for further cooperation, particularly in the economic and energy sectors.

Once again, I would like to express my sincere appreciation for your willingness to meet with me on such short notice. I would also like to take this opportunity to extend my congratulations on the recent celebration of Easter, as well as on another very important occasion: Cosmonautics Day, which holds great significance not only for Russia but for the entire world. It is noteworthy that in Indonesia, many prominent individuals have been named Gagarin or Yury.

Vladimir Putin: Thank you, Mr President. I believe your visit is both timely in the context of current global developments and important for further strengthening and deepening our bilateral relations.
Once again, thank you for being here in Moscow today.

It is particularly meaningful to receive Easter greetings from the head of state of the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. We are a multi-confessional nation, and we traditionally celebrate religious holidays together with our compatriots of different faiths, including Muslims.
Thank you.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

On April 13, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had a telephone conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

The parties exchanged views on the developments in the Persian Gulf following the US-Iran talks in Islamabad, and supported the immediate and permanent cessation of all hostilities, accompanied by further political and diplomatic efforts to overcome the crisis resulting from the unprovoked aggression against Iran by the United States and Israel.

The ministers shared the view that inflicting harm on the civilian population and infrastructure in the region is unacceptable.

Sergey Lavrov and Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan agreed to maintain contact to assist with the sustainable resolution of the crisis and the resumption of normal operation of the Strait of Hormuz and other waterways in the region.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

On April 13, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had a telephone conversation with Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran Abbas Araghchi.

Abbas Araghchi informed Sergey Lavrov on the details of the Iran–US talks held in Islamabad on April 11.

The Russian side welcomed the continued commitment to pursuing diplomatic efforts and seeking solutions that would address the root causes of the conflict and achieve long-term stabilisation in the region, taking into account the legitimate interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its neighbours.

Sergey Lavrov stressed the importance of preventing a relapse into armed confrontation and reaffirmed Russia’s consistent readiness to facilitate a settlement of the crisis, which has no military solution. He also recalled Russia’s initiative to develop the Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf, involving all littoral states and supported by extra-regional countries capable of making a constructive contribution to the negotiation process.

The Russian Foreign Minister also expressed his sincere condolences to Abbas Araghchi over the brutal killing, as a result of an air strike, of the former Iranian Foreign Minister – Chair of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran Kamal Kharrazi.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: Earlier this week, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov wound up his two-day visit to Beijing, where he held talks with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The ministers coordinated their countries’ positions on current international issues and bilateral relations. What is the Russian Foreign Ministry’s assessment of these meetings? How important is the close coordination between Moscow and Beijing at the UN, BRICS, and SCO, particularly in a situation where the crisis in the Middle East calls for joint steps to ensure global strategic security?

Maria Zakharova: As you have rightly said, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s two-day visit to China ended just yesterday. He had a meeting with PRC President Xi Jinping, and there were detailed, four-hour talks with Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

Let me remind you that Sergey Lavrov presided over an extensive, 90-minute news conference for Chinese and Russian journalists following the talks. Its transcript is posted on the Foreign Ministry’s website. To answer your question in brief, let me quote Sergey Lavrov, who said the following: “Russia and China are playing a stabilising role in the trends that are fighting to prevail in international life.”

The trends we support consist precisely in an interaction that has a stabilising role in efforts to promote the ideals of justice, equality, non-interference in internal affairs of each other, respect for the sovereignty of each state, and respect for the nations’ right to choose their own path of development. All of this is enshrined not in just a bilateral vision of world order, but in international law, in the UN Charter, which our countries do not abolish or rewrite. Neither do they invent tricks intended to circumvent its ideals. On the contrary, they respect and implement it. They are also doing their best to preserve it for future generations and for active practical work. 

Russia
Source: mid.ru

On April 15, Director of the Department of International Organisations of the Russian Foreign Ministry Kirill Logvinov held a briefing for representatives of the embassies of BRICS member states and partner countries on the upcoming election of the UN Secretary-General.

Kirill Logvinov outlined the criteria Russia applies to candidates for the post of the chief administrative officer of the United Nations.

Particular emphasis was placed on the importance of ensuring that the future Secretary-General strictly observe the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety and interconnection, pursue an impartial course, promote a unifying agenda, and counter the dominance of Western officials within the Secretariat.

Otherwise, the UN will be unable to fully restore its effectiveness and standing.

Diplomats from BRICS member states and partner countries confirmed their readiness for close coordination during the upcoming UN Secretary-General election in order to ensure due regard for the legitimate interests of the countries of the Global South and East.

It was agreed that the «interactive dialogues» with candidates for the post of UN Secretary-General, due to begin at the UN General Assembly on April 21, will provide member states with a good opportunity to voice their expectations.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

On April 15, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had a telephone conversation with Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud.

The ministers exchanged views on the situation in the Strait of Hormuz after the US-Israeli attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran and Tehran’s response actions.

They reaffirmed the importance of an immediate termination of the hostilities, which are having a negative impact on the Persian Gulf countries, primarily their civilian infrastructure. They also expressed a shared opinion that the United States and Iran should continue their political and diplomatic efforts with Pakistan’s mediation.

Sergey Lavrov and Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud also called for a dialogue involving all interested parties to coordinate conditions that would guarantee long-term stability and security in the region based on a balance of interests of all regional countries. Russia and Saudi Arabia are ready to contribute to the organisation of this dialogue.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Ladies and gentlemen,
My visit to the People’s Republic of China was held yesterday and today. Yesterday, I held talks with Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi, which lasted over four hours. During the talks, we discussed a broad range of issues, mostly our bilateral relations but also international issues, which is understandable. The international situation, which is deteriorating as a result of the actions by our Western colleagues and developments in Ukraine, Latin America, the Strait of Hormuz and other parts of the Eurasian continent we share with China, is directly influencing bilateral relations between various countries, including between Russia. China and our partners in the SCO, BRICS and other multilateral associations.

We discussed the implementation of agreements reached by President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping on developing our trade, economic and investment cooperation in a way that would protect it from the malicious influence of those who do not rely on the ability to compete fairly but on sanctions and other illegal methods of enforcement, blackmail and dictate. We noted that we successfully fulfilling the tasks formulated at the top level.

Our trade exceeded $200 billion for the fourth year running. That goal was previously formulated, has been achieved ahead of schedule and maintained as the foundation of our material and practical cooperation.

The relevant structures, primarily the mechanism of annual meetings between our heads of government and the five intergovernmental commissions operating within that mechanism at the level of deputy prime ministers, are tackling various tasks across various sectors. These include energy, which has certainly acquired special importance in the current situation, as well as high technology, space exploration and nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, education and culture.

Speaking about humanitarian issues, President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping launched the 14th cross year in January 2026. We held cross years of culture; now we will hold the Cross Years of Cooperation in Education. We have proposed highlighting this aspect of education when preparing the programme and the agenda of President Putin’s visit to China in the first half of the year.

At the international level, we are interested in foiling the open attempts by the West, including the United States and Europe, to maintain or even renew their hegemony in the hope that the 500-year-long experience of controlling the world, subordinating it to their interests, and creating global control mechanisms that allowed them to live off others, in particular through slave trade, colonialism and other instruments, could be modernised and further used to continue living off others and bend them to their will. Neither China nor Russia, nor the majority of countries throughout the world, can accept this approach.

We talked about the situation in various parts of the world, focusing on Eurasia where more seats of tensions are developing. In Europe, NATO has been trying to find a new meaning for its continued existence, primarily by incorporating Ukraine. We are watching the EU’s militarisation against the backdrop of crises within NATO over differences between Washington and European capitals, primarily the Brussels bureaucracy.

The Middle East and the Persian Gulf zone, the site of events of concern for all sides, are a crisis knot that will not be easy to untie. I do not think that the ongoing attempt to cut that knot will succeed. Nevertheless, Palestine, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan River must not be overshadowed or pushed to the back burner, as we and the Chinese delegation have clearly stated today.

Central Asia – an interesting geopolitical struggle is unfolding there due to the Werst’s attempts to enforce its “rules,” play the key role in how Central Asian states should live and who they should develop relations with. The same is taking place in the South Caucasus, although not so obviously. There are also crises elements that developed over years due to Western policy in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia (primarily on the Korean Peninsula), the Taiwan Strait, and in the East and South China Seas.

The Eurasian continent is, one way or another, an arena of serious conflicting trends and actions by the leading members of the international community. It is the largest and richest continent with virtually inexhaustible resources. That is why the geopolitical and geoeconomics components are especially important.

Our leaders, President Putin and President Xi Jinping, traditionally prioritise these processes within the framework of their trust-based contacts during mutual visits. Russia and China also highlight these issues within the framework of the SCO and BRICS, and in relations with ASEAN, the Eurasian Economic Union and China in the context of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative.

We mostly spoke about Eurasian issues, which are coming to the fore of global politics and attract increasing attention of the international community. However, this does not mean that we are not concerned about strengthening positive and neutralising negative trends in other parts of the world. This includes Latin America (Venezuela and Cuba), and Africa, which has overcome the economic effects of political decolonisation but remains strongly dependent on the former parent states.

A second awakening underway in Africa, as I have noted on numerous occasions, involves fighting for economic independence, when the continent will cease to be the colonial and neo-colonial raw materials base for the West but will start taking advantage of the benefits of industrialisation. We remember that the Soviet Union actively helped the liberated African countries advance towards that goal by strengthening their independence. Russia and China intend to continue to help African countries take control of their lives, countries and economies.

I planned to make this brief; I hope that I have succeeded. I am ready to take your questions now.

Question: In 2026, we will mark 30 years of Russian-Chinese relations of strategic cooperation and partnership and 25 of the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation. Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi has said that our bilateral relations have stood rock-solid against all odds. How would Russia define the essence and global significance of Sino-Russian relations of comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership in the era at the current stage?
Sergey Lavrov: I fully agree that our relations stand rock-solid against all odds. This is not just a nice phrase but a statement of fact proved by a number of processes where Russia and China act like a stabilising force in the battle of trends for global domination.

The trends we support boil down to unwavering cooperation in promoting the ideals of justice, equality, non-interference in each other’s affairs, respect for others’ sovereignty and the right of nations to choose their own path of development. All these ideals have been enshrined in the UN Charter. When Russia and China formulate their goals as you have said just now (other options include “standing together” and “working together to promote our interests”), what we primarily have in mind is that all countries must respect the UN Charter.

Regrettably, our Western colleagues did not intend to act in compliance with the UN Charter even when they signed it in 1945 (or in compliance with many other documents they have signed since then), and with the principle of sovereign equality of states, a vital element of that fundamental international legal document. Look at the West’s actions after 1945, when that principle became an international law, to judge the West’s compliance with the principle of respect for the sovereign equality of all states. It has not done this in any conflict that has happened in our history.

Neither does it respect it now, as you can see from the self-assigned right of the West (both Europe and the United States) to outlaw, adopt economic sanctions, deny visas, terminate agreements in the sphere of cultural exchanges, and banish participants from festivals for failure to support the openly racist and neo-Nazi slogans of the Brussels bureaucracy.

You know, power lies in truth. If it is true that all nations have ratified the UN Charter, then all nations must comply with it. We and our Chinese friends remain committed to the high ideals enshrined in the UN Charter, which we not only cherish as ideals but also as a guide to action. That’s why our positions are very strong. And that’s why Russia and China are supported by a large group of countries which we describe as Global Majority.

Question: You said that July 16, the day when we signed the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation, which will be extended, will become a landmark day we will never forget. Can you explain why? Do you have a special programme for that day? Is it possible that President Vladimir Putin will visit China on that day?
Sergey Lavrov: That is, you want me to say why we will remember an event that has not yet happened?
Yes, we will remember it. As for why, I can’t tell you now because the programme of extending the treaty is still being considered.

I think you know that that such programmes are not made public until their final approval. The same goes for the timeframe and agenda of visits, especially top-level ones.

Question: China is experiencing energy shortages caused by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Can Russia make up for these shortages? Has this issue been raised during the talks, in particular the implementation of the Power of Siberia-2 Project?

Sergey Lavrov: Russia can certainly make up for the resource shortages facing the PRC and other countries that are interested in working with us on an equal and mutually beneficial basis. We have discussed this more than once. President Vladimir Putin briefly touched on this issue in connection with the European countries’ or rather the European Commission’s plans to sever all ties with Russia in the energy sector meaning our hydrocarbon supplies.
It is no coincidence that after this crisis had erupted following the unprovoked aggression of the United States and Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran, European officials started calling on the European Commission to have mercy on EU member states’ national sovereignty and postpone its plans to completely shut off the valve. Figuratively speaking, they are beginning to realise that if Europe were to get off, in their words, the Russian oil and gas needle now, it could automatically end up on an energy aspen stake of another great power, which it is busy sharpening for later use on the Europeans. So, we are witnessing a captivating inflection point.

On a broader scale, though, the Power of Siberia 2 Project has been discussed by Moscow and Beijing for quite a while now. They compared its advantages over existing infrastructure and energy routes and how they will harmoniously complement each other, including with the projects being developed in Central Asia as part of the Belt and Road Initiative.

It’s a vast continent. As part of what President Vladimir Putin has called the emerging Greater Eurasian Partnership, we would prefer to avoid duplication and create a group of integration participants who, while developing their own subregional programmes, will harmonise and complement each other. The Eurasian Economic Union has such relations with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The EAEU also has signed an intergovernmental agreement with the People’s Republic of China on the harmonious combination of the Eurasian Union’s integration plans with the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative. The SCO and the EAEU cooperate with ASEAN as well. These are the three most active integration associations striving to coordinate their actions with each other and thus maximise the benefits derived from the advantages provided to us by our geopolitical and geoeconomic position as well as us being part of the vast Eurasian continent.

However, all of that took place when the rules on international markets, including energy markets, were more or less observed. As you may recall, these rules were established by none other than the West primarily as part of their globalisation model, which the United States strongly promoted after World War II bringing its other allies to heel and promoting this globalisation with the dominant role of the US dollar, ensuring in practice, as they believed, respect by all for the principles of free competition, the presumption of innocence, inviolability of property, and much more that has now been thrown onto the scrap heap.

This process began well before the special military operation during the first administration of US President Donald Trump, and under Joe Biden as well. It continues now with renewed vigour as part of the sanctions imposed by the previous administration which remain in place and which the new administration maintains, reinforces, and expands, as well as the discrimination of Russian companies on global energy markets, and the direct consequences of the aggressive US military policy and military actions.

That brings me to Venezuelan oil. First, they made an argument that Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro needed to be brought to reason because he was supposedly the chief drug lord. No one remembers the drug narrative anymore. They say drugs are coming from Mexico, but, they claim, we made a deal and took Maduro away, and now we own the petroleum. They planned to do the same with regard to Iran. US President Donald Trump said more than once that he was ready to take Iranian oil, or at least to agree on managing it jointly with Iran.

The Strait of Hormuz has been blocked. It was never blocked before the attack on Iran, nor did it create any inconveniences for the movement of goods be it energy, oil, LNG, or food and fertilisers as well as many other things that, by the way, ensure, ensured, and I hope will continue to ensure to a large extent the socioeconomic development and trouble-free life of our close partners from the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. All of that has come under great risk.

Not far away, on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, runs a water artery that begins in the Mediterranean Sea, goes through the Suez Canal, then reaches the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which washes the part of Yemen that it now controlled by the Ansar Allah movement, or the Houthis, who are allies of Iran. They have been put on notice that they too will be bombed if they try to interfere with shipping in this artery that is vital for world trade. However, the question is not who will do what and who will punish whom. The question, as always, lies in the root causes.

I have regularly and frequently spoken with almost all of my friends from the Arab countries of the Gulf over the past few weeks, and they cannot refute a very simple-sounding talking point. Would Iran have taken any steps to block the Strait of Hormuz and to strike US assets on the Arabian Peninsula, if not for the aggression of Washington and Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran? Everyone recognises that this would have never happened.

So, as in any other conflict, the core cause is precisely this aggressive policy with two things standing behind it. For Israel, it is an absolutely unshakable conviction that Iran must be wiped off the face of the Earth. How can one believe in this? I have no idea, I don’t understand.
US President Donald Trump also said (he was unable to hold it back) that he would, quote, destroy that civilisation. You are aware of what kind of reaction that caused. Beyond this ideological charge to overthrow a regime that embodies a culture and civilisation that has existed for many millennia, such a goal in itself can command neither respect from a universal human perspective, nor respect in terms of anyone’s belief in its feasibility. The second task is again about the petroleum markets, which the United States, above all, set for itself, in addition to backing up Israel.

We could discuss these topics at length but thankfully the People’s Republic of China and Russia have everything they need such as the already operational capacities, reserve capacities, and planned capabilities so as not to depend on such aggressive adventures that undermine the global economy and energy sector.

Question: Moscow is increasingly warning about the militarisation of the European Union in anticipation of a so-called possible war with Russia. How does this affect Serbia’s cooperation with Russia and China, given that they are permanent members of the UN Security Council, that they have not recognised the self-proclaimed independence of Kosovo and are an important pillar in the struggle to preserve Serbia’s territorial integrity?

Sergey Lavrov: Moscow is warning of the dangers of EU militarisation. However, the principal aspect of what is occurring is not that we are issuing warnings, but that the militarisation itself is proceeding at a very rapid and tumultuous pace. There is no concealment of the fact that it is precisely this militarisation that is regarded by the current European elites as the guarantee of their own existence.

The Americans are assiduously cultivating these processes of European militarisation in line with their policy of divesting themselves of responsibility for the security of the Old World. They desire that everything they have wrought – having unleashed a war against Russia through the hands of the illegitimate Ukrainian regime, which was brought to power by the West twelve years ago – that all the consequences of this adventure should be borne by Europe, and that they should no longer burden the American treasury. This is stated in plain text.

Mr Keith Kellogg, who was one of Donald Trump’s special envoys for Ukrainian affairs – in particular, he was assigned “the portfolio” of communicating with the Kiev regime – disappeared for a time, but now he is actively promoting the idea that a new military alliance must be created. Not to draw Ukraine into NATO, because that has already been rejected both by President Donald Trump and other members of his administration, but rather, Keith Kellogg, being also no stranger in Washington, is advancing together with European “grandees,” as they are called, the idea of establishing a new military bloc with Ukraine as a member. Indeed, not merely as a member, but as its leading participant. Vladimir Zelensky actively supports this idea. The United States thus wishes to shift onto Europe the primary responsibility for containing Russia, in order to free its own hands for the Chinese direction. They do not conceal this. In pursuit of these interests, they are attempting to stimulate not only discussions, but practical steps towards the creation of such a military bloc – announced as anti-Russian in advance – with Ukrainian participation.
I mentioned Keith Kellogg in this context, but he is not entirely in the frame at present; rather, one of the leading military figures, the Under Secretary of War, Elbridge Colby, recently stated at hearings in the United States Senate that Donald Trump is inclined to persuade Russia and Ukraine towards a compromise and regards achieving peace on terms fair to Kiev as the most important element of a system for the long-term containment of Russia. That, in essence, is all one needs to know about how the negotiation process – initiated on the initiative of Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin – is proceeding, which we welcomed and continue to express our readiness to see continued.
Although it has also had an impact on us. In August 2025 in Alaska we accepted proposals which, we were convinced, were put forward by the United States in good faith and with the most benign intentions. Regrettably, since then those agreements – not the spirit, but the agreements and understanding of Alaska – are being blocked, and torpedoed by that very European ruling elite, ensconced in Brussels, Paris, and Berlin, whom London actively sings along with, even attempting from there to lead this “discordant chorus,” which openly desires to preserve the Russophobic charge of the entire European continent (including both NATO and the European Union). Now a new bloc with Ukraine as its principal participant is being contemplated. Vladimir Zelensky states plainly that Ukraine will defend Europe from Russia. All this against the backdrop of discussions that after the cessation of hostilities, security guarantees must absolutely be provided to Ukraine.

The Nazi, Russophobic, openly racist regime of Vladimir Zelensky has banned Russian culture. It is the only country in the world to have done so, which receives absolutely no advice from the West on this matter whatsoever, simply banning the Russian language, Russian education, culture, and the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church. We tell our Western colleagues, who attempt to mediate, that this is wrong: “Let us now agree somewhere on where we will halt hostilities, but then we will deal with this later.” No. This is not something to be dealt with later. It is not some element of any conditions, of any negotiating positions. It is what any normal country is obliged to do.

This is enshrined in the UN Charter: respect for the rights of every person, including those pertaining to language and religion, as well as in the numerous human rights conventions, and in the Constitution of Ukraine. But amidst all the talk about the European prospects of the Kiev regime, no one from the Western countries ever dares to tell it that, for a start, before we later address specific matters concerning the future of the Ukrainian state, let us bring it into a normal, human shape. No one does this. Everyone prefers not to speak about this.

Instead, from both Europe and Washington, statements are heard to the effect that however you agree on something on the ground and wherever you stop with Russia, we will immediately provide you with a guarantee. The deployment of stabilisation forces is also mentioned. French President Emmanuel Macron revels in this thought. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer likewise echoes this point. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said not long ago that apparently the French and the British wish to deploy some sort of stabilisation contingent there. It is clear that without the technologies possessed by the United States, they will not manage this. Washington’s position is that if there is peace, it will be ready to support them. That is to say, there is no talk whatsoever of transforming the Ukrainian regime into something normal through elections, nor through the imposition of any requirements from the “democratic” world.

I’ve wandered a bit from the Kosovo issue, but not by accident. In Kosovo, the West showed that it considers itself “a law unto itself.” Or rather, it follows the bits of the law that suit it on any given day. Back then, what suited it was the UN Charter provision that all nations are equal and that every nation has the right to self-determination. But the West had no intention of going through the usual process for exercising that right, by holding a referendum (or some other form of public consultation). Instead, it simply declared Kosovo an “independent state.” It doesn’t matter that a number of EU and NATO members rejected that outcome. It is now being cemented and pushed forward. They are trying by hook or by crook to “shoehorn” Kosovo into the UN, the Council of Europe, and other organisations designed for sovereign states.

When the West tried to “carve up” the Russian Federation, to drive a wedge between us and the Ukrainian people, to derail our efforts to restore the Russian state’s authority over the lands it founded, and where a people who had always been part of that state lived, they suddenly said there was no right to self-determination, only the need to respect sovereignty.

I am straying from Kosovo again, but I’ll come back to it. After the West-orchestrated coup in Kiev twelve years ago, when Crimea rebelled and broke away, and Novorossiya also refused to accept the new regime, we got the big lie about the Minsk Agreements. Their implementation was guaranteed by the UN Security Council. If that had actually happened, the conflict would have been resolved long ago. And we wouldn’t be seeing what’s unfolding now. Russia was ready to accept the Minsk Areements. We supported them, co-authored them. We were ready to stop there, if only everyone else had acted in good faith. And all this time, the UN Secretary-General and his spokesperson, when talking about Ukraine, have been insisting that the UN Charter and Ukraine’s territorial integrity must be respected. When we asked about the right to self-determination, they simply dodged the question.

Recently, Donald Trump mentioned Greenland. And suddenly Mr Antonio Guterres’s official spokesperson – the Frenchman, Stéphane Dujarric – believes that the Greenland issue should be resolved on the basis of the UN Charter, respect for sovereignty, and the right of peoples to self-determination. So we officially asked the Secretariat leadership: if Greenland has the right to self-determination, would you now retroactively recognise the right to self-determination of the peoples of Crimea, Novorossiya, and Donbass? We were told that was a different story. I am not joking. The sheer crudeness of the policy being pursued by the Secretariat leadership is appalling.

And the same goes for Kosovo. On Kosovo, the Secretariat hides behind the International Court’s ruling – the Serbs appealed to that court back in 2008. Shortly after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, the International Court decided that when a part of a state declares independence without the consent of the central authorities, that does not violate international law. It’s permitted.

President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reminded our Western colleagues of that ruling, saying: at the time, we believed that applying this to Serbia was a betrayal of its history, because Kosovo is tied to centuries of Serbian statehood. But since our Western colleagues accepted that International Court ruling, why not apply it to the events that followed the coup in Ukraine, especially given that, unlike in Kosovo, there were referendums held there? And there is simply no way to suspect those referendums of being rigged. There were huge numbers of foreign observers on the ground. No answer.

Now, on Serbia. Why do I keep bringing up other things when I’m supposed to be talking about Kosovo? Probably because the Serbian people need to understand where they are being invited. President Aleksandar Vučić, in conversations with President Putin and with your humble servant, has repeatedly said that he sees the European prospects for Serbia mainly in terms of his country’s economic interests and integration into EU-built infrastructure. But those interests will never be pursued at the expense of relations with Russia, because the Serbian people, as all the polls show, have always had a positive attitude towards the Russian Federation, as well as towards the People’s Republic of China. President Vučić has repeatedly said he will not join the EU on anti-Russian terms.

We respect that position. But we also hear what Europe is saying: you can restart accession talks if you meet two conditions. First, recognise Kosovo’s independence (which alone tells you everything you need to know about the anti-Serb nature of Brussels’ stance), and second, you must impose every single EU sanction on the Russian Federation without exception. That’s that. In other words, they are trying to turn Serbia into a buffer zone against Russia.


Unlike the European Union, we want to see the Balkans have unifying infrastructure in every sense: economic and cultural. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which is also very popular and actively promoted in the Balkans, has the same goal – to unite and maximise benefits for everyone. So of course, we stand with the Serbian people, as does the People’s Republic of China. I have no doubt we will respect the choice of the Serbian people. They should be asked what future they want for themselves. And President Vučić understands that perfectly. As an experienced and leading politician, he has his finger on the pulse of his citizens.

Question: We note that you maintain constant contact with your Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi. Ahead of your departure for Beijing, you also held a telephone conversation. Do you regard the United States’ demand for the complete transfer of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles as objective?

Sergey Lavrov: I would reframe this question. All the more so, as we have long addressed this matter in engagements with both the American and Israeli sides, as well as with representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and equally within multilateral frameworks, including the UN Security Council.

This began over ten years ago, during the elaboration of an arrangement concerning the Iranian nuclear programme.

Ultimately, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to settle this issue was agreed, wherein Russia likewise played a leading role, including in addressing the Iranian dimension of this understanding. A specific volume of uranium for energy needs was agreed upon, which Iran retained for use in research activities and electricity production. The remaining enriched uranium was transported to the Russian Federation, where it underwent dilution and conversion into fuel for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Consequently, Russia, within this equation, has consistently played a constructive role, which was both accounted for and acknowledged by the JCPOA in the settlement of the Iranian nuclear programme. After the administration of Donald Trump withdrew from this plan – and it had been among the most significant achievements of multilateral diplomacy in modern times – during his first term in the White House, the Europeans did not accuse Washington of violating such a sound multilateral arrangement. Instead, they began demanding that Iran continue to observe all the restrictions imposed by this programme. We all participated in these negotiations and elucidated to our Western counterparts that an arrangement is precisely that – its durability is underpinned by reciprocity. If one state, moreover a state such as the United States, which played a pivotal role in the talks, merely declares that it now considers itself unbound, then how can one demand that Iran adhere to limitations it assumed over and above those stipulated by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the universal safeguards administered by the IAEA.

It was the European Union that played the most detrimental role in twisting the substance of the UN Security Council resolution concerning the Iranian nuclear programme, “engineering” nothing short of a disgraceful swindle against diplomacy. Now it asserts, on the basis of these adventurist actions, that UN sanctions against Iran have been reinstated. Neither Russia nor China recognises this, nor do the majority of other normal states. We continue our relations with Iran in full accordance with international law, which currently makes no provision for any international sanctions.

Negotiations are due to resume any day now. As we are informed, the problem that currently remains unresolved at the talks held in Islamabad is “what to do with enriched uranium.” I have communicated with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran Abbas Araghchi. We are in contact, as I have already indicated, with the American side as well. This topic has surfaced repeatedly over the past two to three months, including in contacts between President Vladimir Putin and American, Israeli, and Iranian representatives. We will accept any decision that satisfies the Iranian side within the framework of its legitimate rights.

International law presumes that every country possesses the right to enrich uranium exclusively for peaceful purposes. Never, anywhere, not once has Iran attempted to expand these peaceful purposes into any ambiguous interpretations or thereby sought to employ its technologies for military ends. There exists no evidence whatsoever.

In Iran, as you know, before the brutal killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at the onset of the aggression, there existed his fatwa categorically prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons. The IAEA has never – despite Iran being the most inspected country under the Agency’s purview – recorded any suspicions that enriched uranium could have been diverted towards military objectives.

The right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes is an inalienable right of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the Islamic Republic itself disposes of this right in the course of negotiations – whether it takes a pause or insists on preserving this right – any approach grounded in this principle of the universality of the right to enrichment will be accepted by the Russian side.

I very much hope that those who directly participate in the negotiations – the American side in this instance – will be realists and take into account the interests of the entire region, and will not persist with the unprovoked aggression from which, first and foremost and most of all, let us call things by their proper names, the allies of the United States suffer – I refer to the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf countries, our good friends. We are not indifferent to how such adventures impinge upon their economy, well-being, prosperity, and population.

Question: Peter Magyar who won the elections in Hungary said that he would not call Moscow, but that he would take a phone call from Russia, if any. In this context, what does Moscow think about prospects for establishing relations with the new authorities in Budapest, especially in the light of the fact that Brussels is already demanding that Peter Magyar start quickly revising Viktor Orban’s foreign policy?

Sergey Lavrov: We are polite people, and when someone, including President of France Emmanuel Macron, says that he will soon call President of Russia Vladimir Putin, we see this as his intention. When he does not call, we see this as an indication of the fact that his mood has changed.

If Peter Magyar, the leader of the party that has won the elections in Hungary, now says that he will not call President of Russia Vladimir Putin, then we see this as his personal right to be the master of his own wishes. I do not want to comment on anything here.

We never shy away from dialogue. President of Russia Vladimir Putin has repeatedly noted this and proved this by specific deeds. Of course, we would like people conducting dialogue with us to really represent national interests of their countries and peoples. Consequently, this would facilitate substantive dialogue.

Question: You’ve confirmed Russia’s readiness to help with the Iranian settlement. Does that mean Moscow is prepared to take on the role of formal guarantor of any future agreements, like the Normandy format, or is this more of an advisory role? Could Russia initiate an emergency inspection to confirm that Iran has no nuclear weapons, or offer other security guarantees?

Sergey Lavrov: Historically speaking, across modern history, Russia has always been part of the process that ultimately led to the agreement on safeguards for resolving Iran’s nuclear programme. To that end, we have the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was agreed by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Iran and Germany, and endorsed by a Security Council resolution. That comprehensive plan and the resolution backing it contain everything needed to address any concerns that Iran might one day start producing nuclear weapons. They contain everything needed for reliable verification that Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme is not being diverted into a military one. The United States destroyed that programme. That’s what Israel always wanted. It happened in 2019. It’s a sad fact of modern world history.

Now the only hope is to rebuild something similar from the ruins left by that major multilateral diplomatic agreement. Russia, just as it was when that programme was agreed back in 2015, is ready to play its part in resolving the enriched uranium issue. That could take various forms, including converting highly enriched uranium into fuel-grade uranium and transferring a certain amount to Russia for storage. Anything acceptable to Iran, as long as it doesn’t violate Iran’s inalienable right (like any other state’s) to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.

Negotiations are currently underway in Islamabad. The first round has taken place. The parties have commented on it in different ways, but they haven’t walked away from the idea of continuing. We’ll see. That should become clearer in the coming days. At the same time, there’s a group of countries that want to organise external diplomatic support for settlement efforts: Pakistan, Türkiye, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. They have already met in that format.

We are in touch with all of those states and their representatives who are working on resolving issues around shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and, more broadly, the Iranian problem. We discussed this with our Chinese friends today. We are willing to help these efforts if our help – and China’s – is needed.

In that context, let me remind you that many years ago, our country proposed developing a Security Concept for the Persian Gulf. That would have brought together the six Arab monarchies of the GCC, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and their immediate neighbours – Iraq and Jordan. At the time, we envisaged the five permanent members of the UN Security Council forming an “external perimeter”, supporting negotiations that, following the principles of those “good old days” of the pan-European process, would focus on developing security guarantees, confidence-building measures, and transparency around military exercises. That initiative never got off the ground, even though several meetings of political scientists from all the countries I mentioned found it quite promising.

But there were also those who were dead set against any steps towards normalisation between the Arabs and Iran, in particular in the Gulf region. Later, before these military actions began, before the hostilities were unleashed, before the aggression of June 2025, and two or three years before that, we tried to revive interest in this idea.

Our Chinese colleagues put forward a similar initiative. They have done a great deal to kick-start a practical process of reconciliation and normalisation between the Arabs and Iran. In particular, the PRC leadership quietly facilitated agreements between Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran to normalise relations and exchange embassies. That, too, wasn’t to everyone’s taste.

You can see what’s happening now. Beyond the stated existential desire to wipe out Persian civilisation, to take control of or get hold of the oil, there is a hidden desire to prevent rapprochement and normalisation between the Arabs and Iran. That’s also achieved by stoking the intra-Islamic tribal tensions between Sunnis and Shiites.

We, like China, are trying to push in the opposite direction. Yesterday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and I discussed how we can help facilitate normalisation at this stage. I won’t go into details, but we sense growing interest in achieving that kind of normalisation. We’ll see how things go – but the position of the GCC itself will be crucial.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has stated publicly that it is ready for this kind of interaction between the littoral states, so that both the Gulf and the straits become zones of peace, cooperation, and mutual benefit.

Question: On Monday, US President Donald Trump said that the United States might “stop by” Cuba after it was through with Iran. As you see it, what is the likelihood of the US putting into practice its threat in relation of Cuba? What are the likely implications of this step for Cuba and the situation in the world? Has Cuba applied to Russia for mediation in talks with the United States?

Sergey Lavrov: I will not engage in guesswork as to what consequences this step is likely to entail. We have heard a lot of statements from Washington. Far from all of these later materialised into practical actions.

We have repeatedly reiterated our firm support for sovereignty and independence of our Cuban friends. Statements by Cuban leaders, including President Miguel Diaz-Canel, confirm their resolve to uphold freedom to the end by all expedients at their disposal. We, like the People’s Republic of China, are rendering Cuba political (at the UN and other forums), economic and humanitarian support.  

We have sent the first tanker with 100,000 tonnes of oil for Cuba. This is certain to last them for a couple of months. I have no doubt that we will continue to give them assistance of this kind and that the People’s Republic of China will also go on participating in this effort.  

I hope that the United States will not relapse into the era of direct colonial wars and suppression of free nations. It is not Cuba that has renounced a dialogue with Washington for decades. The United States did whatever it could to isolate the Cuban state, although the Europeans maintained and continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba for a long time. In the meantime, Washington was attempting to engineer a regime change by “stifling” the Cuban economy. Regrettably, this policy continues to this day.

I would advise the United States to start a dialogue with a government whenever it dislikes one. Throughout history, not a single country, including Venezuela, ever refused to dialogue with the US. But the United States used to make a deal and later would renege on its promises. Agreements were signed with Cuba during the Obama administration. Havana accepted them. They were mutually respectful and mutually beneficial. They say that politeness and good manners can achieve much more than the opposite traits of human nature.

Question: With the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz announced by President Trump effectively in place, another key strait - the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which is also used to ship energy - may be shut down as well. Does Moscow think that, in the absence of a peaceful settlement and due to mounting economic pressure, the Gulf countries might join the conflict? In your assessment, how high is the probability of the conflict widening, and what are Moscow and Beijing doing to prevent this scenario from playing out?

Sergey Lavrov: I have touched on this topic several times in my previous remarks.

They want to drag the Gulf countries into the war. To reiterate, those who started this strongly want to prevent the normalisation of relations between the Arabs and Iran, and to advance the two-war concept. According to them, the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran was attacked by the United States and Israel doesn’t mean much when it comes to Iran’s right to respond. Why? Because, they claim, Iran begins its response on the territory of the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. The Arabs did not attack and stated from the very beginning that they would not provide airspace or allow the use of US bases on their territory to attack Iran. That much is true.

We strongly supported this approach in our contacts with the Arab nations, including at the top level. President Vladimir Putin spoke with the President of the UAE and other leaders. We pointed out that we not only deeply respect this position but also stand in solidarity with them that they should not be affected by that war.

Let’s be frank about it. I have conversations with all my counterparts. It was impossible not to understand that US military assets on the territory of Iran’s Arab neighbours would become legitimate targets that Iran would attack in response to the aggression against itself. Everyone was clear about that. The Arabs have tried, primarily with the help of the Americans, to push a resolution at the UN Security Council that would simply condemn Iran for an unprovoked attack on its neighbours and for blocking the Strait of Hormuz, without saying a single word about what happened before that. In conjunction with the People’s Republic of China, we made an honest effort to explain that this resolution does not reflect the objective process, but was once again used to promote cancel culture.

The West is fond of cancelling the historical period which inconvenienced it when it tried to justify its actions in a particular crisis. This is how it began the modern history of the Ukraine crisis as well. We were accused of annexing Crimea. We say that the people of Crimea refused to recognise the coup d’état. They say the coup was one way democracy works, while Russia allegedly up and annexed Crimea. The same thing happens whenever the West finds earlier developments or root causes inconvenient; it goes ahead and cancels them, end of story.

This resolution, which the People’s Republic of China and Russia did not support and prevented from being adopted, had the root cause blotted out from it as well. Future generations would have been left with a record that Iran supposedly attacked its neighbours for no particular reason.

History has proven that this resolution would have changed nothing, because just a few hours after that UN Security Council meeting, it was announced that peace talks would take place in Islamabad. Had this resolution been adopted, Iran, which was unjustly condemned in it, would have been antagonised, and the talks might not have taken place. We would all have understood the reason behind Iran’s position. Or, if those talks had not taken place and the war had continued, those who attacked Iran could have said that the UN Security Council approves their actions and that they were acting in accordance with it. Neither we, nor our Chinese colleagues, nor the Arab countries themselves need any part of that. No one needs to see the UN Security Council steamrolled that way as it undermines the authority of the UN and its Security Council.

We insist on these talks continuing and on an agreement on returning to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz be reached. This would remove the risks of a recurrence of this situation in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The leaders of Ansar Allah, the Houthis, have already made clear that if this aggression were to continue, they would be forced to resort to such measures.

There is no need to provoke the developments which cripple most of the global economy. Throughout the entire existence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Strait of Hormuz has never been mentioned among the problems concerning freedom of navigation and maritime trade. Never. The problems arose only following the February 28 attack, which took place in the midst of negotiations.

Russia and China are strongly in favour of seeing these talks continue so that the parties pursue realistic and fair goals, fully taking into account the legitimate rights of every country in accordance with international law. We and China stand ready to support various formats for external facilitation of these negotiations. We discussed this matter in detail yesterday as well.

Question: Russian-Chinese ties are growing stronger, but what about relations between Moscow and Washington? Have we overcome the freezing point? For example, the talks on Ukraine have been put on ice. Is there hope for their resumption?

Sergey Lavrov: Our relations are not frozen. They were put on ice under President Biden, whose administration fully terminated all contacts. A summit meeting was held in Geneva in June 2021. It looked to me like a candid and serious conversation between two experienced politicians, but the United States soon started knocking together an anti-Russia coalition of Western countries and states that depend on the West and Washington, making waves and alleging that we plan to take over Ukraine. You remember these narratives.

We responded on President Putin’s instructions with the idea of signing Russia-US and Russia-NATO treaties on security guarantees, which would formalise the agreements reached several decades ago, namely, that NATO will not expand into the post-Soviet space. The proposal was rejected categorically and arrogantly.

As part of that process, I met with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Geneva in January 2022. He said it was out of the question, speaking with a sense of superiority that was characteristic of the “talking heads” of the Biden administration.

That’s when things happened. Their categorical refusal to guarantee NATO’s non-proliferation and Ukraine’s non-admission to the bloc has created a situation when our relations were shut down. It was not our fault. Even when we started the special military operation, we remained open for contact, ready to answer questions and explain our actions. But they blocked all communication channels. When President Trump was elected, he said that it was wrong, that he did not start that war, that he inherited it, that he wanted to stop it and to launch dialogue with President Putin.

A dialogue was launched very soon. They spoke on the phone. In February 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and then National Security Adviser Michael Waltz held a meeting with me and Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov in Riyadh. It was a candid conversation when we said that ideology should be put aside, and that we should be guided by national interests, which Russia, the United States and all other countries certainly have.

After that, there were other phone calls between President Putin and President Trump, and finally, the meeting in Alaska. Before it, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff visited Moscow several times to put forth their ideas. The Americans put these ideas on paper and presented to us in Alaska. All the participants made their comments, including President Putin and me.

To cut a long story short, we accepted the proposal made to us in Alaska and remain committed to these arrangements, as President Putin has pointed out on multiple occasions. We are not to blame that the European “pack” hastened to convince the US administration to reject and withdraw its own proposal.

I have told you before what they are saying now. Their main idea is to end the war at the current contact line. At the same time, Zelensky says that they will never recognise these regions as Russian territories. No referendum, the Crimea and Donbass are Ukraine, and they will only designate them as “temporarily occupied territories.” This is not what was proposed in Anchorage, where the United States proposed the idea of the de jure recognition of realities on the ground.

They also say that if the conflict is frozen, Zelensky will tell the people that Ukraine has not surrendered, the West will continue to guarantee the security of the current Kiev regime without changing it and its Nazi essence, and that it won’t do anything to stop its flagrant violations of human rights, the rights of ethnic, language and religious minorities, and the glorification of Nazism. They have it enshrined in law and actively applied.

As for the “freezing point,” our relations with the United States have not reached that stage. We engage regularly at various levels. We remain open to contacts: some initiated proactively, others at the request of the American side. Not all of these interactions are publicised, as very often practical results depend on the “regime of silence.” I have said this on numerous occasions and I want to highlight this again: we harbour no illusions about the objectives pursued by the United States, even when it claims to be guided by national interests, in contrast to the previous administration of Joe Biden.

These interests are clearly outlined in doctrinal documents such as the national security and energy strategies, which explicitly set the goal of achieving dominance in global energy markets. This objective is being actively pursued, including in relation to Venezuelan oil. Now, they are also trying to use some kind of “scheming” around Iranian oil, aiming to profit from it one way or another.

Look at the recent decisions by the Donald Trump administration. Not only have sanctions introduced under Joe Biden been extended (all sanctions Joe Biden introduced against Russia have been extended), but additional measures have targeted Lukoil and Rosneft, effectively pushing them out of most international projects and limiting their operations largely to the domestic market.

We assess the situation soberly. Should the Ukrainian crisis be resolved with full consideration of Russia’s legitimate interests, we would be interested in restoring investment cooperation with the countries willing to engage on an equal and mutually beneficial basis.

We sense that there are companies in the United States interested in such cooperation, and that the administration shares this interest. We will see what promising mutually beneficial projects remain by the time the US says ‘Thank God, we have settled the Ukraine issue, so let’s get down to business now.’ So far, only the theoretical dimension has been discussed. First, the Ukrainian crisis must be resolved, then there will be business. However, the scope of these projects may shrink by the time the US decides to start business talks. 

I would like to conclude with the fact that the global developments once again reaffirm that the upcoming anniversary of our relations with China will be dedicated to more than just festivities, though they are important, too. It is also essential to reinforce public understanding in both Russia and China of the deep bilateral ties, strategic partnership, and readiness to act together in the current international environment.

Naturally, these anniversary engagements will largely focus on identifying shared interests and developing concrete approaches to advancing them amid profound global changes. As attempts by Western countries to preserve their dominance continue, the international system is shifting from globalisation toward fragmentation.

The fragmentation can be seen as a form of emancipation from global economic and financial mechanisms historically shaped and controlled by the West. Major reforms are imminent. The role of such organisations as BRICS, the SCO, and the G20 in shaping new global governance mechanisms will, of course, only increase.

In this context, the global governance initiative proposed by Beijing in August 2025 appears particularly timely. The formation of structures to address such issues is now being actively considered.

Today, when receiving our delegation, President of China Xi Jinping emphasised the initiative’s importance for consolidating the global majority around efforts to ensure stability and order in international relations, grounded in the principles of the United Nations Charter – which was highlighted once again. This opens up huge opportunities for further cooperation with our Chinese friends.

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

On the morning of April 15, President Xi Jinping met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Xinhua News Agency writes.

Xi asked Lavrov to convey his sincere greetings to President Putin. Xi pointed out that this year marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the China-Russia Strategic Partnership of Cooperation and the 25th anniversary of the signing of the China-Russia Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation.

The two countries' comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation maintains a high level of development and has achieved fruitful results in cooperation in various fields. The stability and certainty of Sino-Russian relations are particularly valuable in the face of an international situation intertwined with events, and the strong vitality and demonstration significance of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation are even more prominent.

The two sides must make every effort to implement the important consensus reached between President Putin and I, strengthen strategic communication, close diplomatic coordination and promote a comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation between China and Russia that stands higher, goes more steadily and goes further.

Xi emphasized that in the face of major changes not seen in a century, China and Russia must use closer and stronger strategic cooperation to firmly defend the legitimate interests of the two countries, safeguard the unity of the global southern countries, and reflect the responsibilities of major powers and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

Both sides must maintain their strategic focus, trust each other, support each other, develop together, and do their own thing well. It is necessary to give full play to the advantages of proximity and complementarity, deepen all-round cooperation and enhance the resilience of their respective development. It is necessary to strengthen multilateral cooperation, firmly safeguard and practice multilateralism, work together to revitalize the authority and vitality of the United Nations, coordinate and cooperate closely within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS countries, and promote the development of the international order in a more just and reasonable direction.

Sergey Lavrov conveyed President Putin's sincere greetings and good wishes to President Xi Jinping, saying that under the strategic guidance of the two heads of state, Russia-China relations have shown a high degree of resilience in a complex external environment, trade and investment cooperation has gained momentum, and people-to-people and cultural exchanges have become increasingly close. It is closely coordinated on multilateral platforms such as the United Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS countries, and APEC.

In the face of the severe and complex international situation, Russia is willing to work with China to effectively implement the important consensus reached by the two heads of state, maintain high-level exchanges, strengthen pragmatic cooperation, promote people-to-people and cultural exchanges, safeguard international fairness and justice, and promote greater development of Russia-China relations, and make greater contributions to world peace and stability.

Wang Yi attended the meeting.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Mr President,

I would like to express our sincere appreciation for your kind words and this meeting. They are evidence of your personal attention to the development of mutually beneficial strategic relations with the Russian Federation, and to the issues that will be discussed at the next summit during the upcoming visit of President of Russia Vladimir Putin to the People’s Republic of China. I held a detailed discussion of preparations for the next vital visit with my friend, Wang Yi, yesterday.

Thanks to the diplomacy pursued by our leaders, you and President Putin, our relations have demonstrated high resilience to the economic and geopolitical shocks that have swept the world, as you have pointed out. Regrettably, these differences are increasingly acquiring a military dimension. In this situation, relations between Russia and China, which are playing a stabilising role in international affairs, are becoming increasingly important for the rest of the world, for the Global Majority, which does not want problems and turbulence but peaceful conditions for sustainable and long-term development. We have held an in-depth discussion in this context and will report to you about its results today.

Our bilateral relations are growing in trade, the economy, investment, humanitarian, cultural and other spheres. We discussed regional and international issues in terms of Russia and China’s future bilateral actions, as well as in light of our activities at the UN, the UN Security Council, the SCO, BRICS, G20 and APEC.

As it was noted yesterday, we have very good roadmaps for advancing in all directions which you and President Putin have outlined for the coming period.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: For the past 20 years, you have essentially been arguing that the US rules-based order is essentially a fiction masking the American hegemony, and that the United States has abandoned itself. But here is what the world looks like right now, and I want to make a tie to one of the central themes that we talked about last year: multipolarity. The world looks like this: the United States is bombing Iran, it is blockading the Strait of Hormuz, it has seized a Latin American leader, it is threatening to annex part of a NATO country, Greenland, and is threatening to leave NATO. Is this the multipolar world that Russia was actually expecting? 
Sergey Lavrov: Diplomats and politicians must base their actions not on expectations, but on the realities that exist at any given historical moment. In truth, a “rules-based order” has never existed beyond being a slogan. Since this term came into use over a decade ago, we have repeatedly asked for a clear compilation of the “rules” that are supposed to underpin this order and be accepted by all. No such document exists.
I have given examples, including the case of Kosovo, where independence was justified on the basis of the right to self-determination. Yet when it comes to Crimea – and later Donbass – the same principle is blatantly dismissed, with emphasis shifting instead to territorial integrity. These decisions are made on a case-by-case basis.
Even during Donald Trump’s previous presidency, his administration uniquely recognised Western Sahara as part of Morocco, without requiring negotiations or further process. Negotiations still continue, but for the United States, the matter was settled.
Israel has long occupied the Golan Heights, and the UN Security Council adopts resolutions on the issue every six months. During his first term, Donald Trump declared the Golan Heights to be Israeli territory. Following subsequent developments in Gaza and the West Bank, Israel now controls not only the Golan Heights – within the boundaries recognised by the United States – but also an expanded buffer zone that was previously under UN supervision, effectively increasing the territory for many square kilometres. This is no longer discussed.
Similarly, the situation in the West Bank is disregarded. No one is talking about the Israeli leadership openly stating that a Palestinian state will never be established, while others continue to repeat, almost ritualistically, that the only fair resolution to the Middle East conflict is the creation of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however, rejects this possibility.
Donald Trump proposed a plan for the Gaza Strip, which was brought before the UN Security Council. The plan called for the disarmament of Hamas, the deployment of stabilisation forces, and, on that basis, the reconstruction of Gaza’s infrastructure – housing and social services. Later, reports emerged suggesting plans to transform the area into a kind of “riviera,” a major development project built around tourism, sunshine, and yachts.
When this draft resolution was submitted to the UN Security Council, we, together with our Chinese counterparts, asked how it aligned with the decisions that both the Security Council and the UN General Assembly had unanimously adopted regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state. We were told that it did not, and that it was a different matter. It was highly unusual for the Security Council to introduce a new initiative on an issue that has been under UN consideration for some eighty years, and on which numerous resolutions already exist, without even referencing the Organisation’s prior decisions. This put us in a difficult position – and yet, all our partners, including the Palestinians and the majority of Arab states – urged us not to block the resolution. As a result, our Chinese partners and we chose to abstain, deciding to give it a chance, particularly since the Arab countries were keen on this approach. While large-scale fighting has subsided, the ceasefire remains fragile.
Furthermore, the situation in Lebanon has become more prominent, where UN Security Council resolutions concerning the status of territories south of the Litani River have been violated for many years. Amidst the developments in the Strait of Hormuz, I believe it is important not to overlook the Palestinian issue. Meanwhile, Syria is also experiencing highly complex developments. A number of Israeli leaders, including, as I recall, Benjamin Netanyahu, have stated that we are seeing the emergence of a “new Israeli state,” even referencing the inclusion of surrounding territories.
What I am saying is that politicians and diplomats cannot afford to focus solely on whatever dominates headlines or breaking news on television and social media simply because someone wants it to be presented as the primary issue of the moment. It would be deeply regrettable if the historic UN resolution calling for the creation of two states – a Jewish state and an Arab state of Palestine – were effectively disregarded and dismantled. This directly ties into the issue of international law.
In the case of UN decisions regarding Palestinian statehood, there is no distinction between the international legal norms that mandate its creation and the rules applied by Western countries. One approach is taken when convenient, and the opposite when it is not. In this sense, a ‘rules-based world’ becomes synonymous with the rule of a ‘hegemon’ and a ‘universal emperor.’
How does all of this align with expectations of a multipolar world? In my view, we are not even halfway there; we are only at the very beginning. This period will be historically arduous, as it will require abandoning many ingrained habits. Some will need to relinquish the practice of imposing their will on others and punishing them, while others will have to stop relying on and acting under the protection of their ‘patrons’ and ‘fathers’ and avoiding responsibility for their own actions. Many nations will also need to abandon their habit of trusting partners who have repeatedly deceived them.
I have been reading extensively on the trends shaping a multipolar world and polycentric world order; such a system is beginning to take shape and becoming an objective reality. The laws of globalisation, largely introduced into modern civilisational life by the United States, were based on principles such as free markets, fair competition, the protection of property, the presumption of innocence, and, above all, the removal of barriers in trade and economic relations, and essentially in all other spheres. However, this [model of] globalisation has now effectively come to an end.
Beginning in the period of US President Joe Biden’s administration, we have witnessed increasing fragmentation, regionalisation, and the rise of trade wars, which the United States is now actively using as tools to preserve and reinforce its former dominance. These trends stand in stark contrast to the principles of globalisation. This signals the emergence of a new reality.
It is therefore unsurprising that an increasing number of subregional structures are exploring ways to shield themselves from dependence on the US dollar, which has now been turned into a tool of war. I clearly recall how, during Joe Biden’s presidency, Donald Trump – who was in opposition then – strongly criticised Biden and his team for undermining confidence in the dollar and its reputation by using it as an instrument of sanctions. Trump and his supporters pointed out that when the United States abandoned the gold standard, it reassured the world that the dollar would not simply serve American interests but would function as a global public good, independent of political pressure or punitive measures. They presented it as the civilisation’s common good – that was the narrative.
Throughout Joe Biden’s term in office, Donald Trump recalled the United States’ promises to the world while criticising Biden for undermining the credibility of the dollar. Upon becoming president, Donald Trump himself warned that he would “punish” BRICS countries if they moved away from the dollar. As the Russian saying goes, the place does not honour the man, but the man does the place.
BRICS is not alone in exploring options for establishing independent payment systems, insurance and reinsurance mechanisms, and direct banking channels that are no longer reliant on the West. Although the New Development Bank was created within the BRICS framework, it still, regrettably, operates on principles rooted in the Bretton Woods system, which are now seen as outdated.
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, upon returning to the presidency in Brazil, revitalised CELAC and, among other initiatives, proposed that it engage in the matters we are now talking about – namely, developing independent mechanisms for business, trade, and investment that cannot be negatively affected externally.
At the same time, under Donald Trump, the United States has responded sharply to any attempts to move away from the dollar. Can such pressure be considered freedom of choice? Clearly not. For objective reasons, the dismantling of the previous model of globalisation will continue. The economic growth of China and India is already significantly outpacing that of the United States. In terms of purchasing power parity, China has taken the lead, and this trajectory is likely to persist. The factual economic, trade, and financial indicators that define global influence are shifting accordingly.
Efforts that the United States is making to artificially delay the redistribution of quotas within the International Monetary Fund and to preserve its veto power do not change this reality. If institutions like the IMF and the World Bank were to align their governance structures, including vote distribution, with the actual balance of power in the global economy and finance, US hegemonic dominance within the Bretton Woods system would have long come to an end.
Let us not get ahead of ourselves and claim that everyone had already foreseen a multipolar world and a new balance, only for Donald Trump to arrive and demonstrate what he thinks about it within just a year. The process has not even fully begun. This is a long historical era, and we must rely on objective trends, including the emergence of new powerful centres of economic growth, cutting-edge technologies, and financial influence. With all of this inevitably comes political weight.
In 2020, President of Russia Vladimir Putin proposed holding a summit with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. However, the pandemic intervened. It is therefore difficult to assess whether the leaders of the United States, France, and United Kingdom were politically ready for such a meeting at the time, although China expressed its support for the idea. I have recently recalled this initiative in one of my speeches. In fact, we have always supported organising constructive meetings, but it is hardly realistic today to expect a balanced approach from our current counterparts in Paris, London, Berlin, and Brussels. Their public statements have placed them in positions from which it is extremely difficult to retreat without significant political costs such as the loss of their voters’ trust and self-incrimination as politicians who do not care about their countries’ future.
There is the G20, which includes virtually all BRICS countries, as well as the G7 and their allies (roughly an even balance, with ten BRICS countries and ten G7 members). There are also other international formats where major powers find themselves in the same place at the same time. In most cases, responsible leaders usually take advantage of such opportunities for direct contact and informal exchanges, which is especially important in a world where circumstances can change overnight. So, some are describing current developments as World War III, arguing that these are the forms global conflicts take today. It is not for us to make such judgments; that is the task of historians.
For us, a country that has endured numerous wars, especially the tragedy of World War II and the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the primary criterion remains the protection of human life and preventing it from being in danger. I do not know whether you heard about this or not, but even this fundamental, genetic principle of ours is sometimes questioned. For example, the head of European diplomacy, Kaja Kallas, has recently claimed that Russia had attacked other countries nineteen times over the past century, some of them several times. And this without counting Africa, she said.
Personally, I remain calm. As long as there are people like this in European countries, we have hopes that their people – historically civilised, educated, intelligent people – will know the true value of such leaders. Eventually, when they aspire of leading a pole in the multipolar polycentric world, I believe they will be given their due.
Question: There is a lot to unpack, and I hope that I can frame my next question so that it will include a lot of themes that you mentioned. You mentioned that the United States uses the dollar as a tool of war; you mentioned BRICS, China, and even Europe.
Here is what comes to mind. In light of your latest trip to Beijing, I believe the annual trade between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China exceeds $200 billion, and I am sorry that I have to express it in dollars, because that is the figure that I came across. You export a majority of your crude oil to China. While you were in China, you said that Russia was in a position to fill in the energy gap. You buy components from China to support your defence industry. You settle in yuan. I understand the strategic relations, but I am wondering if this borders on economic dependency. How those relations that you have with China are different from those – in terms of structure – that you had with Europe that you have been criticising for many years saying it was a trap?
Sergey Lavrov: President of Russia Vladimir Putin addressed this issue long ago, when Russia’s relations with the European Union were still structured and intensive. At the time, Western narratives increasingly claimed that Europe – with its network of pipelines transiting Ukraine and later projects such as TurkStream gas pipeline, Blue Stream gas pipeline, and Nord Stream pipeline – was becoming dependent on Russian gas. President Putin was speaking at a forum when he was asked about this, and he posed a counterquestion as to whether it troubled anyone that Russia, by building fixed pipelines, was in turn increasing its own dependence on Europe. Unlike flexible LNG carriers that can be sent anywhere depending on the current situation in the centres, pipelines imply long-term pricing. As President Vladimir Putin noted, suppliers depend on buyers no less than buyers depend on suppliers. As it turned out, it was unfortunate.
This was further underscored by Nord Stream explosions, when nobody depended on anyone. Certain actors stepped in deciding they did not want gas us trading with Germans and with Europeans via Germans. They would be the ones supplying their gas. So, the dependence issue is complicated.
This also applies to long-term contracts. At a certain stage, Brussels began insisting that member states abandon long-term supply agreements in favour of spot market trading, arguing that such contracts were not sufficiently market-oriented. Every deal must be based on the current conditions, they believed. The speculative nature of spot markets did not concern anyone, though everyone present here know very well how the spot market was developing, for example, during the war in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz: it calmed down on the weekends only for developments to follow. We understand this very well.
However, when Europe rejected long-term contracts, it suffered, too. Today, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and other EC officials emphasise that they have reduced or nearly eliminated dependence on Russian gas and oil imports, or will do so in just a few months. This is presented as a political achievement. You know how the global economy works, and there is probably some statistics somewhere (though it is never shown) that the gas Europe buys from the United States instead of Russia – particularly liquefied natural gas – has become significantly more expensive as compared to previous pipeline deliveries from Russia under long-term contracts.
In contrast, Russia’s relations with the People’s Republic of China are balanced. Trade is close to parity, with a slight surplus on the Russian side, and is not limited to oil and gas. However, pipeline infrastructure in China (there are now plans to build another pipeline) supports its long-term economic planning. China has planned economy, where oil and gas price predictability is essential. Accordingly, long-term contracts remain a priority, unlike in Europe, which does not seem to be interested. Yes, we depend on supplies, but we are interested in them. It is more profitable for us to redirect gas from western Siberia to the People’s Republic of China: the prices are good, and the buyer is very reliable; there are never any disruptions, just as there are never any disruptions in our supplies.
On top of oil and gas, Russia and China enjoy extensive cooperation on nuclear energy and other advanced technologies, such as space. I do not see this as unilateral dependence.
Concerns about dependence perhaps arise when dealing with partners that have already deceived you, and more than once. This is a matter to ponder about. In relations with China, no such issues have emerged in recent history. I believe the diplomacy between the two countries is at its peak. During my recent trip to Beijing, I met with President of China Xi Jinping, who reaffirmed this commitment. I conveyed President Vladimir Putin’s sentiment, too.
Sometimes we are asked why Russia and China do not form a military alliance. There are also political analysts who argue that such a step is necessary, claiming that the situation is moving toward war. These views are increasingly voiced. We have addressed this before. The official documents endorsed by the leaders of both countries state clearly that Russia-China relations are of a higher quality, deeper, and more reliable than traditional military alliances. We can talk about this for a long time and with numerous examples, but this is the feeling shared by the Russians and the Chinese both in terms of personal exchanges across all spheres and between the leaderships.
Question: Mr Minister, I would like to slightly shift gears. Six days ago, Viktor Orbán – arguably Russia’s most reliable advocate within the European Union – lost his reelection campaign in Hungary. His successor, Péter Magyar, said that he was ready to unblock a €90 billion package of aid to Ukraine. What is Russia’s approach, and what is your evaluation of Russia’s losing its most effective veto in Europe?
Sergey Lavrov: I would not overestimate the developments that have taken place in Hungary, nor those that may unfold in connection with elections in other European Union and NATO member states. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, when accused of being pro-Russian, has repeatedly emphasised – and we fully agree – that he is a pro-Hungarian politician.
This wave of labelling leaders as “pro-Russian” appears aimed, above all, at obscuring and delaying recognition of the deep-rooted contradictions that exist and are intensifying between nationally elected governments in EU countries and the Brussels-based bureaucracy, which is appointed through internal arrangements rather than direct elections – much as in the United Kingdom, where, once a prime minister leaves, the next one is chosen during a meeting behind closed doors.
Any bureaucratic system, as Tsarist and Soviet eras show, tends to replicate, consolidate and expand its influence over time. Just look at the US Agency for International Development, whose activities came under scrutiny when the Trump administration returned to the White House a year ago. Such bureaucracy does have some norms, and not just abstract rules the world order is based upon. The European Union has an extensive body of acquis communautaire, which defines procedures in great detail.
There is a growing view among politicians, legal experts, and political analysts that the actions of the current European Commission have gone far beyond its formally mandated powers. It first arose during the pandemic, as you very well know, in connection with large-scale vaccine procurement processes, which did not comply with established requirements and standards, including those on the vaccine quality.
This is the standoff. It was precisely against this bureaucracy that Viktor Orbán raised his voice. He never said, “I demand that we all become friends with Russia.” Not once. Never.
Regarding the 90 billion (which they initially failed to steal from Russian funds – our state reserves illegally seized in Europe – then came up with this loan that won’t even be secured by the stolen reserves), Orbán said he would sign on to the decision as soon as Vladimir Zelensky opened the Druzhba oil pipeline. Zelensky still hasn’t reopened it. He will lie that the pipeline is damaged, I have no doubt about it. This story has been dragging on for two months now. And how long did it take Orbán and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to literally force the European Commission to “kindly ask” Zelensky to allow EU experts to come and see whether the Druzhba pipeline really was damaged? First, it took a couple of weeks just to reach an agreement. And then they were never given access to the pipeline. So how can you expect Orbán to like the current regime that rules Ukraine and, from Kiev, governs the rest of the European Union, including the European Commission? Therefore, I wouldn’t accuse him of pushing a “pro-Russian” agenda.
President of Russia Vladimir Putin never refuses contact if a counterpart from any country makes the first move. French President Emmanuel Macron proposed a visit in February 2022, didn’t he? He came. Naftali Bennett, when he was Prime Minister of Israel? He came. He brought a very interesting idea, which he later took to Kiev. And unlike Moscow, Kiev sent him back to West Jerusalem with it. Many other leaders have visited us – Viktor Orbán, Robert Fico. We never turn down the opportunity. That doesn’t mean that anyone who considers it normal for the leader of a state, large or small, to communicate with their colleagues should become some kind of pariah.
Take US President Donald Trump. We have many disagreements with the current American administration, especially on ongoing practical matters. No sanctions have been lifted since the Biden era, and they still haven’t even returned our diplomatic property. Our companies – Lukoil and Rosneft – have been hit by new sanctions announced by the Trump administration itself, which has made no secret of its goal: US dominance in global energy markets. Venezuela, the attack in the Persian Gulf, and, incidentally, the talk of American companies seeking to buy the European-owned TurkStream pipeline – all of that is part of the same picture. They are already negotiating to buy the transit pipeline that runs through Ukrainian territory. The goal is energy dominance.
Nevertheless, the moment has come for a discussion about how the Americans see the future of our economic relations. Because they keep saying: once things are settled with Ukraine, we’ll have unlimited scope for mutually beneficial cooperation. But despite all this, unlike Joe Biden, who banned all contacts and demanded that everyone else isolate Russia, President Donald Trump, upon returning to the Oval Office, immediately advocated for dialogue. We met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Riyadh in February 2025 and continue to communicate. We met in Alaska, and then I met with Rubio again at the UN General Assembly. We also maintain contacts on other fronts, including on the Ukrainian issue, as you know. Many questions arise.
There are also examples where agreements seem to have been reached, as in Alaska, but something doesn’t work out. Again, envoys from Brussels and nearby European capitals arrive, and Ukrainians travel to Europe, having whispered discussions there. Nevertheless, we are not refusing to talk, and neither are the Americans. We have serious issues at hand.
You began this conversation by focusing on three events. But these three events are increasingly taking on a global dimension, because it is becoming clear to everyone that each of them has consequences. Consequences that suggest, among other things, that one of the participants is pursuing some other goal. Where they declared a fight against drug trafficking, they want oil. Where they declared the protection of the rights of the heroic Ukrainian people, they also want something else – this time in the sphere of security and the long-term containment of Russia.
Currently, a global dimension is evident in virtually every significant process of this kind. This is also part of the formation of that very multipolar world, which will certainly be complex. When the time comes to formalise this multipolar world within some kind of “new UN” or through reform of the existing global Organisation, there will be a latent – and perhaps not so latent – struggle over who can claim the title of “pole” and how that status will be formalised. Will it be by permanent membership in the Security Council, if the UN system remains (which we firmly advocate), or by some other means? And when it is de facto accepted that there is a group of countries that deserve not so much special rights as a special responsibility for the future of the world, then, of course, we will either expand the UN Security Council (we are prepared for this) or some other form will be found.
The G20 was created primarily to provide a platform for leading actors in the global economy to negotiate in a narrow circle, but transparently for the rest. But to a large extent, the G20 compensates for the lack of progress on UN Security Council reform. Because the G20 also discusses geopolitical issues, and countries that would like to be on the Security Council, given their geopolitical weight, partially satisfy that absolutely legitimate aspiration within the G20.
There will be more and more such frameworks. BRICS was mentioned. It is also a structure with several future – or current – poles. But BRICS itself, as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, can have both national and regional poles. Everything will depend on how the real situation unfolds – in the economy, in politics, and in security. And, of course, on which of the leaders at this historical stage will stand at the helm of these emerging poles, and to what extent they can recognise their responsibility for ensuring their coexistence.