Russia
Source: mid.ru

Deputy Foreign Minister and Russia’s Sherpa in BRICS Sergey Ryabkov met with participants of the strategic session of the BRICS Civil Council (Moscow, November 17-18), organised by the BRICS Expert Council-Russia.

A comprehensive discussion took place regarding the further expansion of multilateral cooperation through civil society and the prospects for implementing joint projects. The meeting participants expressed a shared commitment to strengthening the role of the Council, whose establishment was endorsed following the 16th BRICS Summit (Kazan, October 22–23, 2024), as one of the key BRICS institutions responsible for forming a consolidated public position on the principal issues of the BRICS agenda.

UAE
Source: trendsresearch.orglink

Doctoral Fellow, UNU-CRIS and Ghent University
Donald Trump will find a world different from his first presidency. U.S.-China competition is not just a bilateral issue; it includes most countries in the Global South. In recent years, BRICS full and associate members have raised their international activism through multilateralism. In contrast, the Trump Administration has already demonstrated a complete refusal to engage in multilateral agendas, beginning with climate change. In Latin America, unlike during the previous Trump term, Brazil is leading the region restlessly toward a multipolar framework. Lula and Itamaraty, Brazil’s influential Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are betting on BRICS, and especially China, with pragmatism and without fearing constraints from Washington.

This insight analyzes the potential policy scenario involving President Trump and his reactions to BRICS initiatives, including de-dollarization. Trump’s cabinet counts on figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, known for radical postures concerning China, Russia, and Iran. At the same time, U.S. policy and opinion-makers appear to be embracing hawkish policies regarding BRICS projects. Will this republican government be able to reinvigorate U.S. hegemony, given the BRICS’ defiance? Are U.S. sanctions and tariffs appropriate to compete in a multipolar world? Given Lula’s centrality in BRICS, what impact may Trump’s foreign policy have on U.S.-Brazil relations? To answer these questions, the insight will first introduce BRICS as a multipolar bloc that challenges U.S. hegemony. Secondly, the focus will shift toward the relations between Trump and BRICS, demonstrating that BRICS has acquired international prestige in tandem with Trump’s undermining of the bloc’s projects. Lastly, there will be space for an examination of Trump’s backlash against BRICS since 20 January 2025, the day of his second inauguration. The central argument is that, from an international relations perspective, Trump’s foreign policy is indirectly enhancing and legitimizing BRICS’ goals toward de-dollarization and multipolarization of the world order.

To understand why BRICS can significantly challenge Trump’s foreign policy, it is necessary to define what the BRICS countries represent, in geopolitical terms. Initiated by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later by South Africa, BRICS can be seen as a multipolar bloc that aggregates countries in the Global South, challenging, to varying degrees, Western hegemony. Specifically, since its inception in 2009, BRICS countries have attempted to defy the primacy of the Bretton Woods Institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The main collision between BRICS and the White House rests on the bloc’s desire toward de-dollarization of international trade, to foster trade in national currencies and evade the extraterritoriality of U.S. sanctions. For Washington and other Western capitals, BRICS tends to imply an asymmetrical challenger to the liberal international order. The antagonism to the U.S. dollar is of utter relevance, since the monetary hegemony extends from its financial form toward a larger exercise of supremacy, from the political to the military realm.[1] Initially, BRICS was not perceived as a foremost threat to U.S. interests, or at least not a pressing one. Under former President Barack Obama, the U.S. State Department acknowledged BRICS’ emergence, being a helpful label to circle the emerging markets of the Global South.[2] Instead, the first Trump Administration (2017–2021) started to find in BRICS a source of antagonism toward the “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) project. At that time, Trump was able to ally with Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022), distancing Brazil from BRICS and aligning the South American giant with U.S.-led initiatives, notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), by designating Brasilia as a major non-NATO ally. Through the Brazilian case, this insight also aims to emphasize the relevance of all BRICS countries, not just China, in prompting a response from U.S. policymakers. BRICS is not only geopolitically significant, but all members, specifically Brazil, are pursuing a multipolar agenda despite the demands of U.S. foreign policy.

This specification is required since BRICS’ actions are usually seen as dependent on China’s will, which, despite Beijing’s evident economic primacy within the bloc,[3] does not preclude BRICS countries from pursuing their autonomous foreign policy strategy. Moreover, to demonstrate the resilience of BRICS countries related to Trump’s agenda, Bolsonaro’s case is indeed exemplary. Despite Bolsonaro’s full-scale support for the “America First” values and his opposition to left-leaning governments, including China, the former president did not withdraw from BRICS; he instead participated in BRICS summits and even greeted the bloc’s initiatives.[4] The menaces of tariffs and commercial retaliations against China’s worldwide followers were already present during Trump’s first term. Nonetheless, it is arguable that the BRICS has gradually become a significant concern for the Trump Administration over time. When Trump returned to the White House on 20 January 2025, the U.S. and the international order presented a quite different scenario than during his previous term. Back in 2024, JP Morgan alerted that dollar-denominated transactions were decreasing in the commodity sector, where oil and other energy exports were already implementing a timid de-dollarization.[5] Even if implicit, the responsibility for these emerging practices of de-dollarization lies among BRICS countries and new associate nations, such as Iran, the second-largest oil exporter in the Middle East,[6] surrounded by a variety of U.S. financial sanctions. Furthermore, before Trump’s victory, the BRICS bloc welcomed new members that hold a significant share of energy exports, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[7] If Bolsonaro’s Brazil was an ally for Trump to hold against China and BRICS, Brazil can be considered today as a prominent BRICS leader.

Brazil and its BRICS scepter facing Trump

Brazil is likely the most significant change, compared to Trump’s first term, when it comes to the United States’ BRICS-related foreign policy. Firstly, Brazil is the current head of BRICS and hosted the 17^th BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro in July 2025. Economically, the multipolar bloc is showing resilience and dynamism. The IMF forecasted that, by the end of 2025, BRICS countries will achieve a 3.4% GDP growth rate, surpassing the 2.8% of the global average.[8] Furthermore, the bloc’s enlargement process has reached a new expansion phase. In recent months, Global South countries such as Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, and Vietnam have associated themselves with BRICS, while Colombia recently joined the bloc’s New Development Bank (NDB). Under Brazilian leadership, BRICS is capitalizing its advantage toward the Global South. In response to U.S. tariffs, BRICS is answering with soft power and diplomacy. An actual corroboration can be found in the BRICS’ reaction to the Iran-Israel conflict, headed by Brazil. While the Trump Administration decided to join Israel in bombing Iranian nuclear sites, BRICS actively called for de-escalation and exhorted respect for the United Nations (UN) Charter in preventing the unjustified use of armed force.[9] Within BRICS, Brazilian President Lula has consistently demonstrated strategic autonomy toward Washington. Early in his second term, Trump asserted that he would have imposed 100% tariffs on any country attempting to de-dollarize international trade, clearly targeting Brazil and its other BRICS peers.[10] Lula took the opportunity to stress that any U.S. tariff would be met with Brazilian reciprocity, adding substantial criticism to Trump’s denialism regarding climate change.[11]

Lula’s reactions to Trump’s tariffs suggest that Brazil finds in the multipolar bloc a priority not resembling that in the relations with the United States. Arguably, for the first time in Brazilian foreign policy, Latin America and the Global South, under the BRICS paradigm, have become the main vectors of Brazil’s international projection. It is safe to claim that Trump’s narrative has helped and pushed Brazil into fostering the BRICS alliance rather than following the White House’s demands to reshape U.S.-Brazil relations, as occurred with several other nations. From a comparative standpoint, Brazil refuses to accept U.S. demands, such as those imposed on NATO and the Europeans, regarding the increase in military spending.[12] While NATO countries show a willingness to satisfy Trump’s plans, Brazil looks the other way.

 Indeed, from a theoretical lens, Lula’s moves are remarkably coherent with a foreign policy prolonged throughout his three terms in office. Under Lula, Itamaraty engaged in external actions guided by the principles of autonomy, with freedom of action in its international relations, and diversification, seeking political and commercial partners beyond Western governments.[13] Specifically, the current geopolitical climate offers Lula ample room to nourish a South-South scope of action. It should be acknowledged that Lula was at the center of the BRIC alliance, without South Africa at the time, during the first summit in Russia in 2009. Throughout its presidencies, Lula directed a multipolar foreign policy oriented toward the Global South in general, but with special attention to the Middle East. In 2003, Lula travelled to the UAE to meet with the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, beginning a continuous interest in Arab countries, followed by visits to Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Qatar.[14] In this sense, the opening door caused by the erosion of U.S. hegemony has furthered Brazil’s interests in BRICS, the Arab World, and the Global South, diverting attention toward the U.S.

Under the guise of “Peace through Strength”, the current U.S. international agenda can be seen as a catalyst for Brazil and other BRICS countries to trivialize their ties with Washington. Trump’s foreign policy is enhancing the BRICS objectives of multipolarity, de-dollarization, and South-South cooperation. In the Brazilian case, there is an ongoing shift toward the Middle East, also exemplified by Brazil’s invitation, being the host nation of the last G20 summit, to the UAE as a guest country in 2024.[15] It is worth noting that Lula’s last visit to the United States was in 2023, and since Trump’s comeback, there have been no bilateral meetings between Brazil and the United States. Instead, Brazil is proactively advancing the BRICS agenda by focusing on new projects related to the green transition and reform of the international financial architecture. Probably, if the BRICS countries gradually achieve their goals in fully challenging the post-1948 liberal order in the following years, there will be a correlation with Trump’s international stances.

The Trump Administration and BRICS

 Trump and his inner circle, particularly the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, firmly believe in the U.S. dollar’s supremacy as the pivotal tool to MAGA. Still, economic angles portray a different situation. As of 2022, the U.S. dollar accounted for 58% of global foreign reserves, compared to 85% in the 1970s.[16] Of course, the primary opponent to Trump’s global affairs is unequivocally China, which represents a shared concern for Rubio and various Republicans between the White House and Congress. However, Lula’s Brazil is also a source of worries for its bonds with China and BRICS. As a Senator, Rubio explicitly denounced Lula’s de-dollarization attempts with BRICS since fostering trade in local currencies might inhibit the leverage of U.S. sanctions.[17] Generally, in his role as Secretary of State, Rubio appears to influence Trump in fighting back the BRICS agenda, with a focus on Latin America. When Argentina was considering an eventual BRICS membership, Rubio actively applauded President Milei for refusing to join the bloc.[18]

It could be argued that the Trump Administration is not evaluating the BRICS peril by considering the actual effectiveness of de-dollarization and the reform of the international financial architecture. Due to the influence exerted by Rubio and other neoconservatives within Washington’s corridors of power, Trump is likely to misjudge the BRICS entity. It is sufficient to remember that, despite Trump’s menaces toward BRICS countries, the bloc has not stopped its enlargement process, and its activity, now guided by Brazil, is of absolute dynamism. In other words, Trump appears to be helping BRICS achieve its goals, especially in framing the real necessity for Global South countries to diversify their economies and enrich South-South cooperation.

The mere issue of tariffs is indicative of that. At its fundamentals, BRICS has always stood for an alternative to the U.S. dominance, and its free-market policies pushed through the IMF toward the Global South, which created a global dependency on international creditors based in the U.S.[19] Hence, at least for some Global South countries, Trump’s rhetoric on tariffs, curbing immigration, and hard-power practices such as the attacks on Iran, demonstrate that it is of utmost urgency to fade away the dependence on the United States. Also, from a commercial perspective, the tariffs’ rollercoaster generated an unprecedented instability in the U.S. market, which, despite its attraction, motivates countries to look elsewhere. If, during the unipolar moment of the 1990s, there was no alternative to the Western-dominated liberal paradigm, today, BRICS offers a truly appealing one. It is not just a matter of strong rivals of the West, like China, Iran, or Russia, but traditional U.S. allies like Brazil and Colombia, thanks to their roles in the BRICS system, that prove that autonomy and diversification are necessary. Even U.S. observers outline that Trump’s expression of hard power, namely through tariffs, erases the soft power legacy that granted Washington its hegemony over the rest of the world.[20]

Geopolitically, several other U.S. allies might find in a BRICS partnership the right path to counterbalance Trump’s transactional foreign policy. One line of reasoning can suggest that Trump’s retaliatory capacity can hamper BRICS’ functionality. A different look, proposed in this work, asserts that Trump is motivating Global South countries and legitimizing the BRICS agenda toward potential new members. Two signaling cases come from Türkiye and Saudi Arabia. Ankara is a NATO country, while Saudi Arabia benefits from special relations with Washington, as showcased in Trump’s recent visit to the Kingdom. Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are keeping an active invitation to join BRICS. Nevertheless, the fear of reprisals from Washington and other Western nations can prevent them from merging the multipolar bloc, while simultaneously, the uncertainty of Trump’s foreign policy could represent an incentive for Ankara and Riyadh.[21] In any event, the future of BRICS and U.S. foreign policy could be genuinely entangled. Frictions between the multipolar bloc and Trump’s White House are increasing. They will likely lead to further confrontations and divisions between the realities of the Global North and the Global South. For Middle Eastern actors like the UAE, this evolving global dynamic presents both opportunities and challenges. As Gulf countries continue to expand partnerships while preserving traditional ties, nuanced diplomacy and diversified alliances will be key. In this shifting landscape, Abu Dhabi’s pragmatic and multilateral approach can be a model for balancing global currents without becoming polarized by major power rivalries.

Conclusion

Multipolarity is a true challenge for the second Trump Administration. Unlike his first term, where U.S. hegemony appeared to be declining, but not coherently challenged from the Global South, today’s situation is quite different. BRICS cannot be ignored anymore. The alternative to Western dominance offered by the multipolar bloc is increasingly attractive to Global South countries. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that Trump’s foreign policy tries to counter the BRICS’ project, particularly evident through the use of unilateral measures such as tariffs and sanctions. This analysis stresses that Trump’s international agenda is not really undermining BRICS’ agency. Instead, it is catalyzing the leverage of the bloc while also motivating traditional U.S. allies to enhance their strategic autonomy. By looking at BRICS’ foundational aims, such as reforming the international financial architecture and pushing for de-dollarization, it is possible to find an implicit legitimization of this agenda due to Trump’s actions. Latin American countries, namely Brazil and Colombia, are expanding their ties with BRICS largely because of their current clashes with Washington. Moreover, the distancing of the U.S. from multilateralism and climate diplomacy furnishes additional reasons for the Global South to turn toward BRICS. Brazil exemplifies this recalibration. President Lula chaired BRICS with a strong emphasis on South-South cooperation. Being a tradition of Brazilian foreign policy, Lula’s quest for autonomy is gaining consensus among several Global South countries interested in diversifying their international outlook. BRICS offers a proper venue, also due to Trump’s misjudgment of the bloc’s scope and influence, which is reinforcing its legitimacy across the Global South. Within the Trump Administration, figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio embrace a foreign policy reminiscent of the Cold War, where U.S. coercion, today’s combining of military intervention and financial tools, asserts power and reestablishes global hegemony. On the contrary, this attitude is modifying the behavior of historical U.S. allies, such as Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, now showcasing different degrees of BRICS engagement.

It is no coincidence that BRICS’ growth in membership, economic activity, and diplomatic initiatives comes jointly with Trump’s return to the White House. From Brazil’s leadership in BRICS to the UAE’s active membership and Colombia’s strategy to diversify its foreign policy, it is clear that the Global South is pushing for an international order alternative to the Western-led one. U.S. coercive measures, especially tariffs and sanctions, justify the search for a multipolar world where the Global South raises its demands not only within Western arenas but also through its own organizations. However, for the UAE and other Gulf states, the multipolar world can offer benefits and risks. Strategically, pragmatism will be required to balance the approaches toward Washington and BRICS. In this way, Abu Dhabi can consolidate its role as a global convener and policy innovator. As a recent full member of BRICS, the UAE stressed its willingness to diversify international partnerships, being wisely positioned to act as a Global South country with positive connections toward the West. Proof of that is the UAE’s diplomatic outreach, including mediation roles and multilateral initiatives, which shows capacity and ability to find a balance in an increasingly competitive and scattered world order, where complete hegemony looks absent. With this pragmatic foreign policy, Gulf states leveraged their geoeconomic relevance to play an essential role in dialogue within the increasing divisions separating the Global North and the Global South.

The Global South is not homogeneous, and neither can be the foreign policies of its countries. For Latin America, thinking strategically about autonomy in international relations is an urgent necessity, whereas the region needs to further its dialogue with peers in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia to reduce political and economic dependency on Washington. Nonetheless, Trump’s worldview, which finds some praising in the Global South, and BRICS’ vision reflect a deeper transformation. Unipolar dominance is questioned, and the multipolar reality cannot be denied or avoided. Whether BRICS will fully succeed in reshaping international governance remains to be seen, but clearly, Trump’s antagonism provides legitimacy to the multipolar bloc. Multipolarity already provided a piece of evidence: the Global South is no longer merely a subject of great power politics but an active architect of its own destiny, finding in BRICS a proper opportunity.

References

[1]. Rohini Hensman and Marinella Correggia, “US Dollar Hegemony: The Soft Underbelly of Empire,” Economic and Political Weekly 40, no. 12 (2005): 1091–1095. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4416354.
[2]. Mihaela Papa, “BRICS’ Pursuit of Multipolarity: Response in the United States,” Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 7, (2014): 363–380. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-014-0022-2.
[3]. Francesco Bernabeu Fornara, “BRICS by 2049: A China-Dependent Counter to the West?,” Euro Prospects, December 11, 2024, https://europrospects.eu/brics-by-2049-a-china-dependent-counter-to-the-west/.
[4]. Carlos Eduardo Vidigal and Raúl Bernal-Meza, “Bolsonaro versus Rio Branco: transição hegemônica, América do Sul e política externa,” Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad 15, no. 2 (2019): 11–26. https://doi.org/10.18359/ries.4673.
[5]. “De-dollarization: Is the US dollar losing its dominance,” JP Morgan, July 1, 2025, https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/currencies/de-dollarization.
[6]. “Oil Supply: Iran,” International Energy Agency, (2022), https://www.iea.org/countries/iran/oil.
[7]. Kristian Alexander and Gina Bou Serhal, “UAE Entry into BRICS Increases its Diplomatic and Economic Options,” Stimson Center, September 13, 2023: https://www.stimson.org/2023/uae-entry-into-brics-increases-its-diplomatic-and-economic-options/.
[8]. Mayara Souto, “BRICS GDP outperforms global average, accounts for 40% of world economy,” BRICS Brasil 2025, May 2, 2025, https://brics.br/en/news/brics-gdp-outperforms-global-average-accounts-for-40-of-world-economy.
[9]. “Declaração do BRICS sobre a Escalada da Situação de Segurança no Oriente Médio Após os Ataques Militares no Território da República Islâmica do Irã,” Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2025), https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-do-brics-sobre-a-escalada-da-situacao-de-seguranca-no-oriente-medio-apos-os-ataques-militares-no-territorio-da-republica-islamica-do-ira.
[10]. Alberto Maresca, “BRICS could be Donald Trump’s kryptonite,” Latinoamérica 21, February 22, 2025, https://latinoamerica21.com/en/brics-could-be-donald-trumps-kryptonite/.
[11]. “Brazil’s Lula vows ‘reciprocity’ if Trump imposes tariffs,” Deutsche Welle, January 30, 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/brazils-lula-vows-reciprocity-if-trump-imposes-tariffs/a-71463041.
[12]. “NATO Leaders Pledge to Increase Defense Spending,” U.S. Department of Defense, June 25, 2025, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4226009/nato-leaders-pledge-to-increase-defense-spending/.
[13]. Letícia Pinheiro and Maria Regina Soares de Lima, “Between Autonomy and Dependency: The Place of Agency in Brazilian Foreign Policy,” Brazilian Political Science Review 12, no. 3 (2018): 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1590/1981-3821201800030003.
[14]. “Remember Brazil’s Lula 1st visit to the UAE in 2003,” Brazil-Arab News Agency, April 14, 2023, https://anba.com.br/en/remember-brazils-lula-1st-visit-to-the-uae-in-2003/.
[15]. “President Lula meets with Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi,” Brazilian Government, November 17, 2024, https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/president-lula-meets-with-crown-prince-of-abu-dhabi.
[16]. Vladimir Popov, “US Dollar Is Losing It Position of a Reserve Currency: How New BRICS Development Bank Can Ensure a Soft Landing,” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, (2024): 1–11, https://doi.org/10.1080/13547860.2024.2414558.
[17]. Marco Rubio, “Tyrannical China wants to topple the US dollar,” The Telegraph, May 16, 2023, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/05/16/marco-rubio-china-will-topple-us-dollar-leftist-ideology/.
[18]. “Official press release from Office of Former Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL),” LegiStorm, January 14, 2024, https://www.legistorm.com/stormfeed/view_rss/2332833/member/2809/title/icymi-rubio-praises-argentina-for-resisting-brics.html.
[19]. Mohammed Saaida, “BRICS Plus: De-dollarization and Global Power Shifts in New Economic Landscape,” BRICS Journal of Economics 5, no. 1 (2024): 13–33. https://doi.org/10.3897/brics-econ.5.e117828.
[20]. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “The End of the Long American Century,” Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2025), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/end-long-american-century-trump-keohane-nye.
[21]. Oliver Stuenkel and Margot Treadwell, “Will Trump’s Unpredictable Foreign Policy Boost BRICS?,” Foreign Policy, March 24, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/24/brics-indonesia-turkey-saudi-arabia-expansion-brazil-summit-trump/.

Iran
Source: www.tehrantimes.com

TEHRAN - In an analysis, Javan addressed the meeting of prime ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Moscow.

It wrote: The Islamic Republic of Iran’s membership in the SCO has both given the organization a stronger identity and reinforced our country’s position in the international arena based on national capacities. This membership has elevated Iran’s global standing and created new opportunities for the nation. New capacities have emerged within organizations such as the SCO and BRICS, which include countries under sanctions—among them Iran, Russia, and several others. Therefore, it can be said that through synergy among these countries, Iran gains a suitable opportunity to bypass and neutralize sanctions. The membership of major powers such as China and Russia provides a valuable chance for convergence, strengthening economic cooperation, and resisting Western pressure. The common discourse we share today is the protection of independence. With this shared outlook, we can expand our security cooperation and, in the economic sphere, rely on the capacities of Iran, Russia, and China—alongside other SCO members—to stand firm against Western pressures.

Ettelaat: No news of negotiations with US for now

In an interview with Ettelaat, Ebrahim Azizi, head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of Parliament examined rumors about possible negotiations between Iran and the United States. This political figure stated that under current conditions—where international sanctions have returned and we have paid heavy costs due to the 12-day war—any narrative about Iran-U.S. negotiations both contradicts reality and amounts to deflection. In fact, until the Americans express regret for siding with Israel in the war against us, and until they abandon their overt Iranophobia campaign, no move from Iran indicating an understanding with the United States will be seen. While it is undeniable that our economic problems have created difficult circumstances, “escaping hardship” does not justify negotiations with the U.S. or any other country that pursues hostility toward Iran and spares no effort to harm us. The Middle East is economically very rich. Thus, not only Iran but also other Persian Gulf states can achieve their economic goals by cooperating, without reliance on the West. Moreover, having borders with 15 countries has given Iran unique capacities. Therefore, it is sufficient to manage relations with our neighbors in such a way that border capacities become a bridge to meet our economic needs.

Hamshahri: Pressure and sanctions are ineffective

In an article, Hamshahri dealt with Iran’s approach to neutralize sanctions. The paper said: The sanction threats, led by the U.S. and Europe, against Iran continue, yet Tehran, through multi-faceted diplomacy, is more actively engaged than before in countering their effects. One dimension of this approach is the deepening of strategic cooperation with Russia and China. The First Vice President’s trip to China on Monday, along with the Minister of Transport and Urban Development’s consultations in Beijing, are the latest manifestations of Iran’s anti-sanction strategies. Meanwhile, Western threats and propaganda against Iran have persisted in recent days. The U.S. and the European troika, by presenting a draft anti-Iran resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors, are seeking to impose new pressures and complete the puzzle of encircling Iran. Yet recent developments increasingly demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the “pressure and sanctions” narrative against the Islamic Republic. In this context, Iran’s active diplomacy in regional and international arenas provides a suitable platform to break consensus around the West’s sanction-oriented approach.

Iran: A new test for IAEA independence

In a commentary, the Iran newspaper discussed this week’s IAEA Board of Governors meeting and wrote: Following attacks by Israel and the U.S. on three major Iranian nuclear facilities, Tehran, through negotiations mediated by Egypt, reached a technical framework agreement with the IAEA under which inspections continued at sites not targeted, such as the Tehran reactor and the Bushehr power plant. However, with the U.S. and Europe moving to revive expired UN Security Council resolutions, Iran suspended this agreement. From the perspective of Iranian officials, it is unreasonable to expect unilateral confidence-building while the other side seeks political pressure through obsolete resolutions. Iran has consistently emphasized its commitment to obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and continues technical cooperation with the IAEA within accepted frameworks. Nevertheless, the IAEA has demanded immediate enhancement of cooperation, a request that cannot realistically be fulfilled without resolving political pressures. Thus, this week’s Board of Governors meeting represents a new test of the UN body’s independence and its resilience against political influence. The decision to be made in the coming days could either pave the way back to diplomacy or deepen divisions and erode the fragile trust that exists. Iran has clearly stated it is ready for constructive cooperation, but not in an environment where technical instruments are turned into tools of political pressure.

Bulgaria
Source: cryptodnes.bg

A major BRICS member is stepping up its de-dollarization push by preparing new foreign-exchange operations centered on the Chinese yuan instead of the U.S. dollar.

Indonesia is taking a decisive step toward reducing its dependence on the U.S. dollar, announcing plans to launch new foreign-exchange operations centered on the Chinese yuan and, to a lesser degree, the Japanese yen.

The initiative, revealed by Bank Indonesia officials, is part of the country’s broader strategy to expand the use of Local Currency Transactions (LCT) and avoid routing trade through the dollar altogether.
Bank Indonesia Senior Deputy Governor Destry Damayanti explained that settling transactions directly in partner currencies will ease pressure on the U.S. dollar while strengthening Indonesia’s own FX ecosystem. The yuan, in particular, is becoming the backbone of this shift, reflecting China’s rising influence as a BRICS member and global trading powerhouse.

Indonesia’s cross-border activity with China has already surged – LCT settlements between the two countries now reach around $1 billion every month. According to Damayanti, this demand is still outpacing capacity, prompting regulators to develop yuan-rupiah instruments for both monetary operations and futures markets. The goal is to make the yuan a seamlessly integrated settlement currency and reduce exposure to dollar-driven volatility.

For Indonesia, the move is as much economic as geopolitical. Avoiding U.S. dollar conversions lowers costs, improves liquidity, and aligns the country more closely with BRICS’ long-term ambition: weakening the dollar’s global dominance by building parallel financial rails centered on the Chinese yuan.

As Indonesia accelerates its LCT framework and deepens yuan-based trade, BRICS gains another foothold in its de-dollarization campaign—one that could reshape currency flows across Southeast Asia in the coming years.

Brazil
Source: valorinternational.globo.com

FDI stock reaches 46.6% of GDP, confirming Brazil as the bloc’s most internationalized economy and attracting new waves of investment

Brazil leads the BRICS with the highest ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP). In 2024, the country reached an FDI stock of $1.14 trillion, equivalent to 46.6% of GDP, according to a study by the Research Group on Economic Development and Economic Policy (DEPE) at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP).

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The FDI measure indicates long-term capital inflows from foreign companies into a specific country. Among the bloc’s economies, South Africa ranks second with $113 billion in FDI, representing 21.2% of its GDP. India leads with $547.6 billion, accounting for 14%, followed by Russia with $216 billion at 9.9%, and China, with an absolute stock of $3.65 trillion, at 9.5% of GDP.

The study, said DEPE coordinator Antonio Corrêa de Lacerda, was conducted by comparing FDI stock with each country’s GDP in current U.S. dollars.

For Brazil, data was obtained from the Central Bank’s Foreign Capital Census (CCE). For the other BRICS countries, FDI stock information was sourced from the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

Nominal GDP figures in dollars for all economies included in the study were obtained from the World Bank. Using this data, researchers calculated the share of FDI stock relative to each economy’s size and compared the results across the bloc.

According to the study, from a productive standpoint, Brazil is the most internationalized economy among the BRICS, due to the sustained presence of foreign-headquartered companies operating directly within the country. The reason, Lacerda said, is that Brazil’s industrialization historically depended on foreign direct investment.

“So while countries like China and other BRICS members have mostly received investments in recent decades, Brazil has been receiving them for over a century. Additionally, Brazil has long been among the ten largest economies in the world. So there is inherent attractiveness,” Lacerda said.

In Brazil’s case, the Central Bank noted that the FDI stock includes two parts: $884.8 billion in equity holdings in nearly 19,000 companies and $256.4 billion in intercompany transactions, such as loans between parent companies and subsidiaries.

Among investors holding equity stakes in these companies, the United States leads with $244.7 billion, or 28% of the total. Coming next are the Netherlands ($145.5 billion, 16%), Luxembourg ($79.2 billion, 9%), France ($63.3 billion, 7%), and Spain ($61 billion, 7%).

According to the study, the sectors that attracted the most foreign investment were services, accounting for 59% of the total, followed by industry with 29%, and agriculture and mineral extraction with 12%.

Within these sectors, the most prominent activities are financial services and auxiliary activities (22%), along with oil and gas extraction (8%).

Looking ahead, FDI in Brazil will be driven by other sectors, Lacerda noted. According to him, the country is already attracting capital into the technology and artificial intelligence sectors due to increasing demand for data centers. The trend, he added, is also seen in bioeconomy and the broader energy sector.

“There are opportunities even in traditional sectors, such as automotive manufacturing, which is attracting a new group of investors. So while we already had a foundation in traditional vehicle production, we are now seeing the development of a base for electric vehicles,” Lacerda said.
For Felipe Salto, chief economist at Warren Investimentos, Brazil’s status as an emerging economy capable of attracting both large and high-quality investments is not new—and that makes it even more positive. “Despite the persistent difficulty in permanently and significantly improving the fiscal outlook, the progress made so far has been enough to maintain the country’s attractiveness,” he said.
According to Salto, despite the recent increase in the current-account deficit, FDI inflows remain sufficient to offset it.

He also mentioned that Brazil’s foreign-exchange reserves are substantial, which helps keep the balance of payments positive.

One point worth highlighting is the main factor behind the widening external deficit: economic growth, which impacts imports. This indicates the trend is unlikely to continue, given the expected slowdown in economic activity due to the ongoing contractionary monetary policy,” Salto said.

Russia
Source: russiaspivottoasia.com

The leaders of the world’s major economies are gathering in South Africa for the G20 Summit between November 22–23, and they will find themselves at a crossroads confronting a global landscape more fractured, polarized, and competitive than at any time since the end of the Cold War. What was once conceived as a practical forum for coordinating economic stabilization and crisis management has become an arena for ideological rivalry, competing development models, and divergent visions for the future of global governance. The cooperative spirit within the G20 has already been undermined by a rift between host South Africa and the United States, triggered by Washington’s continued adherence to the Trump-era boycott stance. The United States, the G20’s largest economy is not attending. But Russia, along with 19 of the world’s other largest economies, is. 

This year’s summit unfolds against the backdrop of accelerating multipolarity and a widening divide within the group, most visibly between the BRICS members and the non-BRICS economies. The traditional dominance of the G7 economies is steadily eroding, while the BRICS platform bolstered by expanding membership, deeper financial cooperation, and growing trade integration is rapidly maturing into a counterweight with real geopolitical and economic depth. South Africa, as both host and a core BRICS member, symbolizes this shift. Its leadership of the G20 comes at a time when the Global South is no longer content to be a passive observer in structures designed decades ago without its input.

The ongoing G20 Summit in South Africa convenes 19 nations and the European Union (making it almost an unwieldy G47) that together account for 85% of global GDP and 75% of world trade. Yet the forum’s ability to coordinate economic policy is increasingly undermined by global fragmentation, rising protectionism, and some western countries’ politicization attempt to global financial institutions such as the IMF, WTO, and SWIFT. Unilateral sanctions and coercive economic measures by several Western states – including Japan – have further weakened the spirit of free trade, with major G20 members including Russia and China facing deliberate trade barriers. Meanwhile, the BRICS continues to gain momentum, now representing 44% of global GDP and 56% of global population, offering an increasingly effective alternative framework for global economic governance. The BRICS member’s portion of global trade within the G20 is now larger than the non-BRICS portion.
At the heart of this year’s meeting lies an unavoidable divide: the widening gulf between BRICS members and the Western-led bloc inside the G20, a gulf intensified by the West’s hostile posture toward Russia, its trade and technological confrontation with China, and its inability to reconcile calls for reform from emerging economies.

G7 members continue to push for dominance within the G20, seeking to preserve their long-standing hegemonic economic model despite its declining global relevance. The rise of the BRICS group has sharply challenged this outdated posture, exposing the imbalance inherent in Western-centric governance. Today, the G7 represents only about 28.4% of global GDP (PPP), a dramatic fall from nearly 50% in the 1980s and accounts for just 9.6% of the world’s population.

This figure means the BRICS + Partners’ collective GDP (PPP) and population surpasses that of the G7 nations. By contrast, BRICS embodies the economic dynamism and demographic weight of the emerging multipolar era, offering a more representative and equitable alternative to Western economic hegemony. Without G7 countries dominating, many other G20 states and the broader BRICS-aligned Partners are no longer seeking trade alignment toward the Western economic model. Instead, they pursue balanced trade ties with Russia, China, and India, aiming for more equitable and diversified global growth.

This ambition is supported by sky-high growth in non-G7 trade: the BRICS+ share of global merchandise exports has surged to 23.3% in 2023, while G7’s share has declined to 28.9%, according to EY India. The share of BRICS+ grouping in global merchandise exports will overtake the G7 next year. Such data underscores how a multipolar trade architecture is taking shape, one less dependent on the G7, and more rooted in emerging economic powerhouses.

The G20 In NumbersAn Outdated Structure Facing a New Reality

The G20 still represents 85% of global GDP, three-quarters of world trade, and two-thirds of the population, but its power balance has changed dramatically. Two decades ago, the U.S., EU, and G7 economies could plausibly claim uncontested leadership in international economic policy-making. Today, that assumption has collapsed.

In purchasing-power parity (PPP) terms, the BRICS economies collectively exceed the GDP of the G7, while the global financial architecture they once relied upon – such as the IMF and World Bank – is under significant pressure to reform.

As the BRICS expands and deepens cooperation, the Western bloc within the G20 is experiencing visible discomfort. The G20 framework no longer allows the G7 to simply dictate outcomes. Instead, it must negotiate, compromise, and accommodate perspectives it once dismissed as peripheral. This new balance reflects a structural reality: The center of global economic gravity has shifted east and south, and the G20’s institutional culture has not yet caught up.

South Africa’s Role: A Diplomatic Bridge with Increasing Leverage

South Africa’s leadership of the summit – the first G20 to be held in Africa – comes at a particularly meaningful moment. As one of the original BRICS members and now a host in a G20 setting dominated by debates on global inequality, development finance, and institutional reform, Pretoria occupies a strategic diplomatic position. The country has repeatedly emphasized that the G20 must become more inclusive, more representative, and more responsive to developing economies’ priorities. Its stance reflects a broader sentiment across the Global South: the desire for a world order where the rules are written collaboratively, not imposed. For Africa as a whole, the continent’s increasing integration into BRICS, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and new corridors of South-South trade has given its leaders far more collective bargaining power. The G20 meeting is an opportunity to articulate Africa’s expectation that global governance evolve accordingly.

Of immediate note here is President Trump’s decision not to attend the G20 summit by saying that “South Africa doesn’t deserve to be in the G20”, a remark that was also perceived as a slight to the entire African continent – a US presence would have been a sign that Washington takes Africa seriously. In direct contrast, Russian President Putin hosted meetings with the Prime Minister of Togo, in West Africa last week, with the two countries agreeing to establish respective embassies and looking to increase trade and investment ties. With these differing types of diplomacy on display, the African interest in the G20 will be looking to Moscow, and not Washington for development leadership. 

Russia’s Position: Steadfast, Strategic, and Resilient

Against this backdrop, Russia enters the G20 with a clear message: global governance must reflect geopolitical reality, not historical inertia. Despite years of Western sanctions and political pressure, Russia remains deeply integrated into Eurasian trade corridors, energy markets, and food supply chains. Its economic partnerships with China, India, counties in the African Union (AU), Global South countries and other BRICS states have expanded significantly.

Even within the European Union, countries such as Serbia and Hungary continue to pursue bold and expanding economic partnerships with Russia, underscoring a growing trend of pragmatic trade policies in parts of Europe despite pressure from Brussels and Washington. Moscow’s participation in the G20 is therefore not a concession to Western scrutiny but a platform from which to articulate the principles of sovereign development, non-interference, and multipolar cooperation. Bruegel reports that emerging economies have now replaced most of Russia’s lost trade with advanced economies, demonstrating how global commerce is rapidly reorganizing around new growth centres despite Western attempts at economic isolation. Thus, Russia continues to emphasize that the G20 should remain an economic forum, and not a venue for politicized pressure campaigns or unilateral agendas. Moscow’s position finds strong resonance among BRICS members and many outside the grouping, further solidifying the BRICS’ growing role in G20 and beyond.

The additional lessons learned about Russia’s sanctions experiences have been deeply reflected upon by countries in the global south, as Moscow illustrated that with sound prior planning, strong leadership, and investments into emerging markets, the country could survive and even prosper without Western endorsement. That has paved the way for a new era of global south strategic thinking and planning and has given confidence to other nations that could theoretically suffer the same treatment. Instead, there is a realization that they too have the ability, as long as they coordinate properly, and can avoid giving up aspects of their sovereignty to the West in the form of political reform linked loans, unfair contracts, sanctions, and even invasion. The post-war era of Western countries bullying smaller nations is drawing to a close – with Russia key in pointing the way.    

The Western Bloc’s Strategic Dilemma

The West and its allies arrive in South Africa with a complicated challenge. They increasingly seek to use the G20 as a geopolitical instrument both to shape global markets in their own interest and to reinforce Western narratives on issues such as debt restructuring, climate finance, and supply-chain security. Yet these same actors no longer demonstrate a genuine commitment to free trade or to stable global growth. If their goal were truly open markets and shared prosperity, they would not have imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia nor imposed punitive tariffs on the likes of Brazil, China and India.

As one of the world’s essential economic engines, central to global energy security, grain supplies, fertilizers, and critical commodities, sanctioning Russia has undermined not only global market stability as well as the very principles of free trade that the West claims to defend. According to the latest UNCTAD report, global growth is projected to slow to 2.3% in 2025, signaling a recessionary trajectory fueled by rising trade tensions and deepening economic uncertainty. The West’s persistent geopolitical tactics—ranging from sanctions and bloc-based confrontation to the weaponization of financial and trade systems—have become a central driver of this slowdown. Instead of supporting global stability, these actions are undermining the foundations of free trade and predictable growth at a time when the world economy needs cooperation, not coercion.

The Western bloc is grappling with:

• Diminished economic dominance
• Their share of global GDP, adjusted for real purchasing power, has steadily declined.
• Loss of credibility in the developing world
• Long-promised reforms to the IMF and World Bank have largely stalled. Climate finance commitments remain unmet.
• Geopolitical overreach
• Attempts to isolate Russia and decouple from China have alienated many G20 members who view such strategies as destabilizing and self-serving.
• Rising internal divisions
• EU economies face stagnation, while U.S. trade and tech policies increasingly diverge from Europe’s, leaving the Western camp less coordinated than it appears.
• An increasing irrelevance
• The G7 can no longer set the agenda unilaterally, yet it has been slow to adjust its approach to a multipolar reality.

BRICS: The Growing Center of Gravity

While the G20 struggles with internal contradictions, BRICS continues to evolve into a dynamic platform for real economic cooperation:

Expanded membership has widened its geographic and economic reach.

The New Development Bank offers an emerging alternative to Western-dominated finance.
Local-currency trade settlements are increasing, reducing exposure to external political pressure.
Energy, agriculture, digital economy, and infrastructure collaboration are deepening.

For many developing nations, BRICS represents a platform where their priorities of industrialization, debt relief, and sovereignty in development policy are genuinely acknowledged.

This momentum has forced the G20 to confront an uncomfortable question: Can it remain relevant if half its members increasingly see BRICS as a more aligned and effective forum?

With a significantly lower debt-to-GDP ratio than the heavily indebted G7 economies and backed by a 3.7-billion-strong emerging-market demographic base, the BRICS is positioning itself as a pragmatic and fruitful alternative to the Western economic model. As the bloc continues to develop its own financial systems, payment mechanisms, and development institutions, and as Russia deepens comprehensive economic ties across these fast-growing markets, the BRICS is increasingly demonstrating that multipolar, cooperative economic growth can outperform the stagnant, debt-driven framework long promoted by the G7. The BRICS bloc is rapidly building alternative systems: the New Development Bank provides infrastructure financing without Western conditionality; new local-currency payment mechanisms aim to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar; expanded energy and commodity diplomacy between Russia and Gulf BRICS members strengthens control over key energy markets; and enhanced South–South connectivity from the Belt and Road to the North–South Transport Corridors is creating trade routes that bypass Western financial choke-points.

A Decade from Now: Will the G20 Still Matter?
The future of the G20 hinges on its ability to adapt.

• Scenario 1 — Constructive Reform: If Western members accept a more multipolar order, the G20 could evolve into an inclusive platform reflecting today’s economic realities.
• Scenario 2 — Parallel Systems: If reform stalls, BRICS and the wider Global South will accelerate building parallel systems in finance, trade, and technology, leaving the G20 symbolically relevant but strategically marginal.
• Scenario 3 — Fragmentation: Continued politicization risks paralysis, pushing real decision-making into alternative institutions.

For now, Scenario 2 appears the most probable.

The Multipolar Era Arrives, With or Without the G20

The G20 meeting in South Africa will not resolve the structural tensions reshaping global politics and economics. But it may highlight them with renewed clarity. The rise of BRICS, the assertiveness of the Global South, and the resilience of Russia, India and China’s strategic partnerships have fundamentally altered the balance of economic power and contributed the global economic resilience and stability hugely. The Western-led order constructed in the aftermath of the Second World War and preserved through the Bretton Woods institutions no longer commands unquestioned authority. If the G20 wants to remain relevant, it must transform. If it does not, it will gradually be overshadowed by the very coalitions, BRICS and beyond that better reflect the world as it is, not as it once was. Either way, the era of singular Western leadership is over. The age of true multipolarity is here.

This article was written by Ibrahim Khalil Ahasan, a Dhaka-based independent columnist and freelance journalist on contemporary international issues whose work has been published in many local and international publications, and was especially commissioned by Russia’s Pivot To Asia.
Further Reading

Australia
Source: www.lowyinstitute.org

Local currency deals are growing, but a unified challenge to dollar hegemony remains a distant dream.

“We want to do trade with other countries where we pay in digital currencies. It is a necessity for us.”
So said Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament, at the deBlock Summit, Iran’s first international blockchain conference, held on the weekend.

Iran’s quest to evade the crippling international sanctions has prompted it to seek an outlet through cryptocurrencies, representing one of the multiple ways in which individual BRICS members have adopted pathways to lessen their dependence on the US dollar. While some progress has been made with national currencies replacing the dollar for bilateral trade among member countries, achieving dedollarisation, challenging the well-entrenched US dollar as the primary international currency, will be a herculean task.

There has never been a formal proposal at BRICS for dedollarisation. At the first BRIC summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia in 2009, the leaders did issued a joint statement advocating, albeit vaguely, a “more diversified international monetary system”. Since then, Russia and China have remained at the forefront of pushing for the reduction of reliance on the greenback, urging a common BRICS currency and the alternate BRICS Pay payment system to rival the Swift system. The ambition has elicited reactions from various American presidents, including threats from Donald Trump.

Over the years, with China’s rise and its alacrity to challenge American hegemony across different frontiers, the attraction for dealing in local currencies has increased among several BRICS members. With the group now opening its doors to new members, advocates for replacing the dollar, including Iran and Egypt, have added their voices to the chorus. In July 2025, Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly confirmed that BRICS member states are increasingly adopting local currency settlements in bilateral financial transactions as part of a broader strategy to reduce reliance on foreign currencies. Egypt’s move to stop trading in dollars won it Chinese accolades.

Why the currency of a single country should remain the sole currency for international trade is a valid question.

This month, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov announced that his country and China had settled 99.1% of its trade payments in rubles and yuan. Similar remarks had been made by the country’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak earlier this year. In the past, Russian and Chinese officials have emphasised the need to strengthen cooperation in banking, finance, and cross-border payment systems. With expanding sanctions on Moscow, the only way to trade with that country is through national currencies.

A similar agreement has been place between China and Brazil since 2023, when both countries agreed to eliminate the US dollar as an intermediary currency and instead settle trade in their local currencies. China is Brazil’s largest trading partner, with more than US$100 billion bilateral trade annually. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has remained one of the ardent advocates of dedollarisation, characterising the dollar system as an unjust and anachronistic tool of American dominance. However, with its high dependency on the dollar and with more than 80% of its foreign reserves held in the US, Brazil’s voice for dedollarisation isn’t expected to match the shrillness of Beijing and Moscow.

Trump’s tariff-centred politics have succeeded in pushing BRICS members such as South Africa and Indonesia to distance themselves from dedollarisation and a common currency for BRICS. Following Trump’s threat to apply 100% tariffs to BRICS members contemplating alternative currencies and de-dollarisation in January 2025, Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson told reporters that it is “not interested in the issue of de-dollarisation”.

New Delhi, an outlier of sorts in BRICS, has a long history of dealing in its national currency, the rupee, for trade with Russia. In recent times, even while seeking internationalisation of rupee, New Delhi has paid part of its energy bill to Russia in yuan. However, it remains vocally opposed to dedollarisation, dismissing the talk of a common BRICS currency. “The dollar as the reserve currency is the source of international economic stability, and right now, what we want in the world is more economic stability, not less”, External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar categorically stated in March 2025. Moreover, the scenario of being bound to an alternate currency system led by China alarms India. “Imagine us having a currency shared with China. We have no plans. It is impossible to think of a BRICS currency”, Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal said in February this year.

Meanwhile, Chinese state media has called for greater global coordination to achieve dedollarisation, indirectly admitting that none currently exists.

Why the currency of a single country should remain the sole currency for international trade is a valid question. However, it is also true that the protraction of dollar-led international financial system has given the currency a set of decisive advantages, unlikely to be paralleled by any other currency.
Moreover, the dedollarisation goal pursued by China and Russia isn’t really about creating a more multipolar global financial system, but appears to be driven by China’s desire to lead the world and to bypass US and Western sanctions on Russia and Iran.

While Beijing and Moscow are free to pursue their objectives, divergent national interests, varying levels of economic development, and fear of US retaliation, including tariff threats, will always impinge on the pace towards that end objective.